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Here is the investigation I referenced. Consider reading the report and grounding your argument in reality. This stuff is happening. What should we do about it?
by a13o 3y ago
Here is the investigation I referenced. Consider reading the report and grounding your argument in reality. This stuff is happening. What should we do about it?
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-...
- int_19h 3y agoWhatever we can do without restricting E2EE.
- leadingthenet 3y agoThe answer you don't want to hear and is bound to be extremely unpopular is: nothing. If the only way to effectively rein in online CSAM is to fatally compromise encryption, that's a price not worth paying. We have already sacrificed many a personal liberties at the altar of "think of the kids!!", and, as you mention, it's yet to prove effective at the task. A line has to be drawn somewhere.
- a13o 3y agoYou're conflating transport encryption and E2E encryption. The OP article is only about E2E encryption, which is not fully implemented on Facebook to date, so not allowing them (and other VLOPs in the same position) to implement it just maintains the status quo. My claim is that these platforms have a proven history of elevating CSAM on the web and are turning to a currently unused technology, E2E encryption of messages and groups, to crystalize the problem instead of tackle it. This has nothing to do with theoretical beliefs about encryption in general, the value of transport encryption used by Facebook and nearly every other website, or personal liberties. Nobody needed E2E encryption on Facebook in its first couple decades. Nothing is being sacrificed if they don't implement it now. The sacrifice happens when the _do_ implement it. We sacrifice the ability to do anything about the CSAM influencers profiting on the platform. I'm not even arguing for a blanket ban of E2EE. What I'm arguing for is that we don't allow VLOPs to use it.
- leadingthenet 3y agoI am talking about what the original article mentioned, which is that certain Spanish legislators are pushing for what sounds like a blanket ban on E2EE by service providers, including the dominant communication platforms such as WhatsApp and Signal. This, in and of itself, is a massive overreach. > Nobody needed E2E encryption on Facebook in its first couple decades [...] The reality is that "transport encryption" does absolutely nothing to protect you from a malicious, authoritarian state actor, which is why the state's asking for it in the first place and why there have always been activists pushing for adoption of E2EE on these platforms. I should know, I was and still am one of them, so it's a bit absurd to say "nobody needed it for decades" when the only reason it's being adopted in the first place is because there's clear demand. And because the state has steadily gained the ability for technologically feasible mass surveillance for the first time in history, which is also a new phenomenon. > We sacrifice the ability to do anything about the CSAM influencers profiting on the platform. I'll spell it out bluntly: I acknowledge it could have such an effect, and it's a sacrifice I am willing to make, and deem to be a net gain for society as a whole. People have throughout history engaged in despicable behaviour, and will continue to do so in the online world because it's a reflection of who we are as a species, both good and bad. > I'm not even arguing for a blanket ban of E2EE. What I'm arguing for is that we don't allow VLOPs to use it. So we lose the ability to *maybe* do *something* on *some platforms* using only the online communications of the perpetrators, whom probably represent single digit percentages in the population. Meanwhile, traditional policing continues to exist, and the ban would, in practice, affect almost everyone else (or else what's the point?). Except, of course, the technologically literate criminals who will as always find ways around it. I'm assuming you're aware of the far-reaching potential for misuse of your proposal, and presumably that's a sacrifice you're willing to make, so our differences can be easily summarised: you place higher value on punishing a relatively limited number of individuals for crimes deemed particularly damaging and offensive over sacrificing the whole of society's right to private communication, I do the opposite. In fact, if you grant that this issue will likely never fully be resolved (as history suggests is the case), we merely disagree about what the tolerable level for this crime is in exchange for safeguarding societal freedom. Same with all other forms of criminal activity throughout history... As we've already sacrificed much in the name of this very issue, I hope people living in democratic nations understand what's at stake here, and that there will never be an end to these authoritarian arguments. Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.