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> Of the 1067 keys IDs collected through signatures on PyPI, a full 308 (or roughly 29%) had no publicly discoverable key on the major remaining keyservers Eve
by Avamander 3y ago
> Of the 1067 keys IDs collected through signatures on PyPI, a full 308 (or roughly 29%) had no publicly discoverable key on the major remaining keyservers
Even if they existed on Ubuntu's or OpenPGP's, they'd still be annoying to discover due to the fact that GnuPG only supports a single key server at the same time. You want to have a correspondence with both Protonmail and Mailvelope users? Sucks to be you.
Not to mention the fact that if I wanted to maliciously sign something, I'd upload a wholly forged key to those keyservers and you'd happily discover them. It would be a step forward if we'd have more operators like Protonmail that would certify new keys, at least that way in many cases we'd know a key is actually old, rather than generated recently for an attack.
- woodruffw 3y agoThis is a great observation! There's a whole extended digression (which I cut out of the post) on how even the keyserver's response is insufficient, for exactly this reason. PGP as an ecosystem completely lacks any strong identity guarantees of the type that PyPI wants; without those guarantees, this is all just fragile hashing with more steps.