"their segmented memory nonsense was also a waste of development time and I'm glad to see them finally acknowledge it." Burroughs B5000 had segments. Roger Sch

"their segmented memory nonsense was also a waste of development time and I'm glad to see them finally acknowledge it." Burroughs B5000 had segments. Roger Schell said it was added to Intel by a Burroughs guy when they requested hardware-enforced security to protect memory. They wanted to use it in upcoming OS's like GEMSOS. Rings came from SCOMP which also had an IOMMU in the 1980's. Descripters evolved into capability-based computer systems. Intel tried with Intel i432 APX and i960MX (good one). They lost billions. CHERI with RISC-V is the best of that lineage right now. https://www.cse.psu.edu/~trj1/cse443-s12/docs/ch6.pdf https://www.cse.psu.edu/~trj1/cse443-s12/docs/ch6.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20220701015547/https://www.mrheckman.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/DesigningTheGemsosSecurityKernel-OCR-120409-DRAFT.158131458.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20220701015547/https://www.mrhec... https://homes.cs.washington.edu/~levy/capabook/ https://homes.cs.washington.edu/~levy/capabook/ (Note: Aesec might still sell GEMSOS today.) More recently, schemes like Native Client and Code Pointer Integrity used segments. The reviewer who broke the software versions of Code Pointer Integrity couldn't bypass the segment-enforced version. There was probably a lot of unexplored territory in combining modern, memory protection with segments. I'd like the alternatives to have as much assurance as designs on segments gave us. They're getting hacked more often, though.