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There is always one other way left - the usual ways all the scummy companies do this on the web and mobile: make the consent prompt inscrutable, or feel necessa
by TeMPOraL 4y ago
There is always one other way left - the usual ways all the scummy companies do this on the web and mobile: make the consent prompt inscrutable, or feel necessary in context, or both.
- holmesworcester 4y agoYeah, the malicious prompt injection could be buried in a page of inscrutable text, right? A user wouldn't be able to know what they were saying yes too, unless they could understand and approve each individual API call or operation done by the plugin.
- TheDong 4y ago> A user wouldn't be able to know what they were saying yes too, unless they could understand and approve each individual API call or operation done by the plugin. I don't understand this. The suggestion I had was basically: User types "Summarize this webpage http://somesite http://somesite". ChatGPT pops open a dialog "The language model would like to invoke the 'fetch webpage' plugin: Allow/Abort" After you allow that, with the injection shown here, there would be another dialog: "The language model would like to invoke the 'Zappier' plugin: Allow/Abort". Surely OpenAI knows what plugin is being called and can do that, right? Surely that would stop this attack since your original prompt, "summarize a webpage", shouldn't need to invoke a second plugin This certainly doesn't help with the case where you say "Summarize example.com and email it to me" since you couldn't distinguish between "Send email (good)" and "Send email (spam, due to injection)", but for the attack in this post, it seems like it'd suffice.