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The fact that other humans are so similar to me (all humans are similar in virtue of being human organisms) allows for an analogical inference: You guys are sim
by cubefox 4y ago
The fact that other humans are so similar to me (all humans are similar in virtue of being human organisms) allows for an analogical inference: You guys are similar to me, I am conscious, therefore you are probably also conscious.
And whether or not something is conscious matters a lot ethically. If something is conscious, it may suffer. Conscious and unconscious objects have to be treated in a completely different way. We assume rocks aren't conscious and don't suffer from being broken apart, but we assume animals are conscious. That's why we treat them differently.
We can't know for certain whether something is or isn't conscious, but we have to try to make a best guess.
- jnwatson 4y agoWhile assuming that other human-looking things are conscious is a reasonable starting point, it certainly isn’t a given. There seems to be a wide variety of thinking processes. Some folks don’t have internal monologues. Some folks can’t visualize images at all, and the ones that do, do it will varying amount of detail. Isn’t it also reasonable that other humans have different degrees of consciousness, including perhaps not having one?
- Xenomto 4y agoWhat if consciousness doesn't exist?
- jrv 4y agoI think the best argument for that might be that some people don't seem to understand what "consciousness" (in the sense that you are talking about) even means, and how it's different from something that can be explained as an emergent phenomenon of known physics. I then sometimes wonder whether those people are not actually conscious, or whether they just don't get it.
- monktastic1 4y agoIndeed. Nagel famously clarified that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism." Many found this enlightening. I find it extremely perplexing that this wasn't immediately obvious to everyone. On the other hand, in Tibetan Buddhism there is something called a "pointing-out instruction," where your enlightened nature is pointed out to you. Afterward, you wonder how you could have ever missed it. Perhaps I should treat Nagel's paper as analogous. Like "oh, duh, the lights are on. Thanks for the reminder."
- kelseyfrog 4y agoMaybe, but the vast majority of people act, whether they intend to or not, as if consciousness is a social fact. The discrepancy between social facts (especially if they have a plurality of groundings),l and the existence of a scientific fact is fundamentally an interesting phenomenon.
- haswell 4y agoOne definition or property of consciousness I find interesting is that it encompasses “what it is like to be <entity>”. If there is something that it is like to be <animal>, it is conscious. Intelligence and awareness are separate from consciousness in this framing. And there is arguably a point where we can speculate that extremely simplistic organisms could not be conscious, given the lack of sense organs that seems to predicate experience. From a human point of view, the things you describe are the contents of consciousness. I have Aphantasia, while my brother describes his mind’s eye as CAD software and he can construct and manipulate visualizations at will. The overarching awareness we both have that allows us to compare and contrast these things and make any sense out of those comparisons points to a more fundamental layer. What you describe sounds closer to levels of awareness and one’s ability to recognize the workings of their own mind, e.g. some people remain lost in and identified with thoughts, while some are able to both experience and observe thought as just more contents of conscious experience, but not the actual center of one’s consciousness. And there’s evidence that this can be learned (through mindfulness), which to me points to something like: we’re all conscious whether we realize it or not, and not realizing it doesn’t make it not so.
- cubefox 4y agoSomewhat related, there are people who say aphantasia can be cured: https://sashachapin.substack.com/p/i-cured-my-aphantasia-with-a-low https://sashachapin.substack.com/p/i-cured-my-aphantasia-wit...
- haswell 4y agoThanks for sharing this. I didn't mention this above to avoid going on a tangent, but after starting a mindfulness meditation habit earlier this year, I've noticed what I can only describe as more awareness of the void in my visual field, and some morphing and indistinct visual phenomena like a shimmering nothingness. Not what I would call imagery, but something I had not been aware of before. I've long suspected that the condition might be trauma related, a suspicion my therapist shares, and the clarity that mindfulness has brought for me has led to some serious breakthroughs in processing past events. Only time will tell if this will unlock something more visual. Without going into my life's story, it makes a lot of sense to me that aphantasia could be some kind of protective mechanism of the brain to shield someone from events too big to process.
- cubefox 4y agoYeah, but the "expected similarity" (the expected value of the degree of similarity) for consciousness should still be high. That is, there are in expectation more people that are very similar to me than people that are very dissimilar. There is a related Bayesian argument: You draw one ball from an urn with an unknown number of black and white balls. The drawn ball is black. This is some evidence that most balls are black, because otherwise it would have been less likely that you have drawn the black ball earlier.
- AnthonyMouse 4y ago> We can't know for certain whether something is or isn't conscious, but we have to try to make a best guess. We now have AI which is trained on data generated by humans who are (probably?) conscious and feel pain etc. So it can generate output which implies that it's conscious and can feel pain etc., even when that isn't the case. What do you do with something that can pass the Turing test but still isn't human?
- cubefox 4y agoThinking about the analogical inference helps here: We know that LLMs work very differently from humans, and we know why Sydney or LaMDA sometimes says it is conscious (it imitates human text). So the analogical inference doesn't allow us to infer that LLMs are conscious, or provides only very weak evidence. And since it seems plausible that most things (e.g. rocks) are not conscious, it seems reasonable to think that LLMs are not conscious either.
- AnthonyMouse 4y agoReasoning from how we know something works is a shaky foundation when the passage of time causes them to become more complicated and correspondingly causes us to less understand how they work. The existing ones can write code. Suppose we get ones that can write better code and engage in self-improvement. Now you have something which is a billion lines of code and is under constant self-modification. We no longer have any idea how it works, but it can feign consciousness in much the same way as existing LLMs. What's the test for if it actually achieves consciousness? I can give you one that a human being in good health will pass and a rock will fail. Can you give me one that an AI feigning consciousness will fail?
- cubefox 4y agoA good test for an AI would be if we excluded all human text mentioning consciousness, experiences, emotions etc from its training data. Then, when it would still start talking about consciousness, that would be strong evidence that it has consciousness: If it did invent the concept by itself, and mere imitation can be ruled out.
- kajaktum 4y ago> The fact that other humans are so similar to me (all humans are similar in virtue of being human organisms) allows for an analogical inference: You guys are similar to me, I am conscious, therefore you are probably also conscious. That hinges on the fact that the brain, or human-like body, is related to the existence of consciousness. But there's no reason to believe that a bunch of electrical pulses as the source of consciousness. For example, had "I" existed as a plant, then it would be reasonable for me to think that other plants are also conscious and that plants are what give rise to consciousness.
- cubefox 4y agoI am both consciousness and have a brain, and alterations in the brain (chemical or physical) correlate with changes in consciousness. Which suggests that our "bunch of electrical pulses" are at least sufficient for consciousness. Plants may be also be conscious, but that would require the existence of an additional, very different, cause of consciousness than in humans. The theory "X is only explained by Y" is simpler than "X is explained by Y, and X is explained by Z". Ockham's razor suggests it's more likely for there to be fewer causes than many.
- kajaktum 4y agoI am not convinced. Consider the color red. I can explain the physics of what the color red is, how it travels through space, how my eyes interact with the particular waves, sends signal to my brain and somehow generates what I think of as "red". But this explanation is meaningless, there's nothing about the waves that explain why "red" is the way it is. For example, why don't I experience red as blue and vice versa? Similarly, consciousness is like that. I can have an explanation down to the quarks and follow the chain of physical phenomena that happen from the big bang up to this point and I will find nothing that would explain why there's "something" at all. In a sense, the fact that the color "red" is the way I perceive it is merely a coincidence. I happen to experience it that way. There's no reason why it has to be that way. I had similar experience when I learnt that some people don't have inner monologue; it completely blew my understanding of what "is like".
- NoMoreNicksLeft 4y agoWhat is suffering? Can you define it objectively/empirically? If there is indeed such a phenomenon, then why should I care about the suffering of non-humans? Granted, it may be a very bad idea to ignore the suffering of some superhuman AI that was recently invented... don't piss off your godlings after all or they'll smite you. But animals? If suffering made chicken taste better, I don't see any problem with Torture Nuggets.
- cubefox 4y agoWell, suffering is bad, and more suffering is worse than less, and knowingly acting in a way which increases suffering is wrong.
- marojejian 4y agoThis just sounds like minimizing a loss function. by this definition, aren't most machine learning algorithms in constant suffering, which they seek to reduce?
- NoMoreNicksLeft 4y agoYou've presented absolutely no evidence beyond the initial, evidence-less, assertion.
- cubefox 4y agoWhich assertion? That suffering is bad? If suffering isn't bad, do you have an example where its suffering isn't bad for something?
- NoMoreNicksLeft 4y agoThe suffering of non-human animals holds zero moral weight. I am having trouble deciding if a conversation with you is possible, you do not seem to be a rational being. You use the word "bad" in a way that another person would if they were saying "this is either bad for me personally, for those I care about, or humanity in general". Does that mean you'd include sea urchins and wombats in "humanity in general"? If it did, then you're mentally ill in a way I'm not qualified to treat. When a lion eats a gazelle in Africa (or anywhere else, I suppose, if such events occur), it is nothing that I or other humans should care about. It does not matter that the lion eats it while it is alive instead of "slaughtering it humanely" (imagine how I have to word that idea, it's absurd). This "suffering" does not make the universe less optimal. If I could push a button to increase the intensity of that "suffering" a thousandfold, or increase its quantity (or even both!), is there any reason not to push that button? If I didn't push the button, mind you, it would only be because the suffering of those gazelles matters not to me one way or the other. If I could decrease the intensity/quantity with a different button, I wouldn't push it either... and for the same reason. For that matter, if suffering exists at all in any meaningful way (that is, empirically quantifiable), I'd still contend that it only exists for humans. Non-humans can't suffer, they are from a moral standpoint nothing more than meat robots.
- isitmadeofglass 4y ago[dead]