2 ms·
> Although precise definitions are hard to come by, intuitively we all know what consciousness is. This is the key problem. To me it looks like most of this ar
by spion 3y ago
> Although precise definitions are hard to come by, intuitively we all know what consciousness is.
This is the key problem. To me it looks like most of this article is conflicted about what the definition exactly is:
- basic conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain might not require much species-level intelligence at all
- [there will come] a point at which they also become aware—at which the inner lights come on for them
Based on the text, I don't think I understand what the author believes being concious is. I also don't think this argument will advance further until we start defining precisely what we mean.
- guywhocodes 3y ago> - basic conscious experiences such as pleasure and pain might not require much species-level intelligence at all Agreed, I find it even hard to distinguish between a PID-loop and a pain avoiding living thing. If it has no ability to reflect on it's own circumstances at all. There are probably interesting steps between a PID-loop and meta-cognition that philosophers have words for I don't know.
- afastow 3y agoYou are misreading the second point. That's not what he thinks, he's saying that the assumption by many people that that's how it will work is unfounded.
- JoeAltmaier 3y agoIt's a muddy word. We all know what 'unconscious' means: unaware of our environment. Taking the converse of that, every living thing is conscious most of the time.
- spion 3y agoWhat does it mean to be aware of our environment? LLMs can produce knowledge about themselves and the environment. Would placing a LLM in a body that has sensors which convert the current environment into a text stream make LLMs concious?