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I’m sure they are smart, and are applying bigtime brainpower to the project. But my basically layman gut take is, it seems surprising that inside-the-package is
by bee_rider 4y ago
I’m sure they are smart, and are applying bigtime brainpower to the project. But my basically layman gut take is, it seems surprising that inside-the-package is a reasonable place to have an attack surface.
And is it really impossible to sneak an antenna into chiplet?
- hinkley 4y agoMight be time to reread Vinge's Zones of Thought books. Sub in chiplets for motes. Also antennae are not the only side channel attack out there.
- hoosieree 4y agoThe threat model I'm thinking of is the untrusted 3rd party fab. For example, you want to use the fancy new process node that's only available from SketchySemi in some other country. They're happy to do business with you, but you're worried about hardware trojans. Chiplets help isolate the untrusted component so you can focus your scrutiny on its i/o. SketchySemi could put antennas inside the chiplet they sell to you, but you have freedom to orient the chiplet however you want, wrap it in shielding, throttle its power, etc.
- throw0101b 4y ago> SketchySemi could put antennas inside the chiplet they sell to you, but you have freedom to orient the chiplet however you want, wrap it in shielding, throttle its power, etc. TEMPEST shielding is also a thing: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_(codename) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_(codename)