3 ms·
adding `store password somewhere` doesn't get in the way of plymouth's theming (which is separate), it doesn't change the rest of the boot process, etc etc etc
by its-summertime 3y ago
adding `store password somewhere` doesn't get in the way of plymouth's theming (which is separate), it doesn't change the rest of the boot process, etc etc etc etc etc, its taking an open source project, adding some lines to it, compiling, and swapping a binary out. Why would it need to any of this other stuff?
> You'd need root access for that. At that point, it is already game over for the target! Why would you need to tamper with the bootloader at that point?
Yes that is the crux of the Evil Maid attack, a drive-by install of software. e.g. at a coffeeshop while one is on the toilet, at an office, at a hotel by an evil maid, etc etc. AEM is about detecting changes in trust: if the loading sequence is changed, then the verifier (another device like a usb dongle) can't verify (since the TPM can no longer unlock the prior secret due to the chain changing).
You might want to look into the article I linked in my earlier comment to get the full idea of what is meant by evil maid
- AshamedCaptain 3y ago> Yes that is the crux of the Evil Maid attack, a drive-by install of software. e.g. at a coffeeshop while one is on the toilet, at an office, at a hotel by an evil maid, etc etc. If the laptop was left online and unlocked: What do you expect to gain by installing a patched plymouth versus installing a traditional remote control software and/or keylogger ? You don't even need root for the latter! If the laptop was left locked: do you plan to open the laptop, remove the disk, transfer some files to it (matching the same distro & version of all components your target was using, otherwise the entire thing may just crash or look different and reveal the attack), hope the target doesn't notice his laptop was literally taken apart (most laptops just can't be opened at all, for the ones which can, even mine has a simple open-circuit tamper detector...), then come back in the future _and do the same_ again to recover the captured password? And how is this not a ridiculously targeted attack? Besides, at that point, you could simply install a wiretap on they keyboard, an attack which unlike the evil maid crap I have seen _millions_ of times in the wild (e.g. at public pinpads, card readers at gas stations, etc. ).