2 ms·
> Language is a repository of cultural memory broken down to composable bits. So we already have examples of discourse in which we alternate natural language w
by 082349872349872 4y ago
> Language is a repository of cultural memory broken down to composable bits.
So we already have examples of discourse in which we alternate natural language with some other, more formal, language: english with formulae (math), english with tabs [less formal] or staff notation [more formal] (music criticism), english with a set of images with formal denotations (memes), etc. Even Montaigne's essays (which were attempts at deriving results, not just explaining established ones) somewhat follow the pattern in that at times they alternate french with classical quotations.
I hope —I think along with eternalban and Hermann Hesse— that we may see the introduction of new combinators, new forms of composition, that are general enough to serve both as explanations of established thought and tools of generating new thought. (cf Aristotle Organon)
- eternalban 4y ago(Glasperlenspiel? A favorite of mine.) > generating new thought I was beguiled yesterday (reflecting on our chattering mechanical friends) with the idea (new for me) that production of 'thought' doesn't necessarily require a 'thinker'. It's just that we thinkers -- that is the HomoSapiens -- have only known of production of thought as thinkers, and assumed there is 'thinking' involved. (This is what is causing the confusion in some granting GPT the coveted 'thinker' and 'thinking' status.) If that is the case, then we have misnamed 'thought': It was always nothing more than a proposition, but we assumed it was intimately connected with the experience of thinking.
- 082349872349872 4y ago> Glasperlenspiel? Genau. I especially appreciate how millefiori glass beads are a physical incarnation of the literary device of quoting other works... > If that is the case, then we have misnamed 'thought': It was always nothing more than a proposition, but we assumed it was intimately connected with the experience of thinking. That makes a great deal of sense to me; in that world 'thinking' is like imperative small-step operational semantics, while 'thought' would correspond with functional big-step denotational semantics. The former suffices to produce the latter, but is by no means necessary.