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The liability model has a big downside, though. Because sometimes people in charge are idiots, they ignore common sense and make risks. So they possibly get bur
by js8 3y ago
The liability model has a big downside, though. Because sometimes people in charge are idiots, they ignore common sense and make risks. So they possibly get burned only when accident happens, which costs human health and lives.
Regulation is intended to prevent human harm by setting and enforcing a safety standard.
- pjscott 3y agoThe usual hack for dealing with this is to require liability insurance. The insurer has incentives to set premiums at a level that reflect risk, along with reasonable contract conditions -- e.g. "Put guards on all your rotary saws, and yes we will be sending inspectors in to make sure they're being used properly." (How is this different from an ordinary procedural regulator? Because the insurance market has competition, which means that the insurance companies aren't only trying to optimize for reducing risk -- they're trying to reduce risk efficiently. And if they're not very good at it, they can be outcompeted by someone who is.)
- gusgus01 3y agoWhy would they check that the guards are in place when they can reject the claim after an accident happens because the guard wasn't in place? Who regulates the insurers?
- AnthonyMouse 3y agoThat only applies to large rare risks. If a risk is common, anyone who ignores it quickly goes out of business from the liability, so anyone still in business is taking effective measures. If a risk is rare and has a low impact, ignoring it frequently is the right thing to do. You're left with things like plane crashes, which have to be minimized even if they're already rare. But that kind of regulation is extraordinarily expensive, and then the same regulatory model gets applied where it isn't needed.
- roenxi 3y ago> You're left with things like plane crashes, which have to be minimized even if they're already rare. I know we're all trying to be moderate here, but I'm not very good at that: 1) It is irrational. The cost-benefits of aircraft safety make no sense. Planes are held to a standard that we don't hold buses and trains to. We should strive to make rational decisions as a matter of policy. 2) There is no reason to think the US regulators are any good at what they are doing. As the thread root comment points out, the incentives are terrible. US industrial policy over my life time has consistently led to Asian growth and US stagnation in ways that were predictable. The US has banned most of the avenues that it could grow by, and coincidentally growth has largely stopped. Very similar story in Europe too, big focus on banning stuff (plus a bit of redistribution) and small focus on how to achieve more prosperity. The US is dedicating the lives of countless smart people to taking a thing that was going to fly through the air like a bird and ... not changing the outcome much. They could have been doing something else that was more useful, like competing with China for telecoms leadership. I don't think the evidence is there for this "having" to be minimised. The big picture looks a lot like people are behaving emotionally, that is sometimes leading to irrational decisions and those irrational decisions have added up to cause real harm. People should be more accepting of other people taking reasonable risk.
- actionablefiber 3y ago> Planes are held to a standard that we don't hold buses and trains to. Or highway/pedestrian/cyclist safety, for that matter?
- pjscott 3y agoThank you. We are nowhere close to the Pareto-efficient frontier for risk reduction. We could be safer, while sacrificing much less prosperity for that safety, if things were structured better. (The optimal number of plane crashes is not zero, as the saying goes, and it’s probably more than we have now.)
- robertlagrant 3y agoOptimal by what measure? I don't know the saying.
- BurningFrog 3y agoAren't all models vulnerable to "sometimes people in charge are idiots"?
- konschubert 3y agoThat is where mandatory liability insurance comes into play. Because the insurer will check... and if the people in charge are idiots, the insurance will charge them high premiums. I am not sure how well this works in practice - but I think the idea has real merit.
- aero142 3y agoThere is an issue with correlated vs uncorrelated risks. This is the reason that only the federal government can offer FDIC insurance for banks and disaster insurance in Florida. When banks fail, they tend to all fail at the same time and there is no insurer that could hold enough reserves to actually pay out if they all fail together. Private insurance can cover fire insurance for homes, but is unlikely to have enough in reserves to pay if a category 5 hurricane floods half the homes in Florida.
- harimau777 3y agoTo make sure that I'm following, is what you are saying that the risk is that there's a big enough disaster that the insurance company(s) can't pay everything that's owed to those who have been harmed?
- aero142 3y agoCorrect. I'm saying that private insurance is good at insuring uncorrelated risks, like car wrecks, but usually, only the federal government can enable insuring correlated risks. Suggesting that mandatory liability insurance can a good policy alternative to regulation is correct, but if you are regulating something large enough with correlated risks, only the federal government can every really provide insurance. Banks pay FDIC insurance, and bank failures are usually covered by this, but it's pretty clear that the pool of money to save banks is backstopped by the federal government in case of a cascading failure. Even for uncorrelated risk, if the payout event is bad enough, it can't be insured. For example, insurance on a nuclear plant is backstopped by the federal government, because no private insurer could ever really insure the worst case scenario.
- deleted 3y ago
- robertlagrant 3y ago> Because sometimes people in charge are idiots, they ignore common sense This ignores that regulators are also people, with the same traits, but with no vested interest in making anything work.