4 ms·
> Why might engagement be low? Easy. The whole point of owning stock is to (a) have the right to vote in elections for the Board, (b) have a share of dividends
by solatic 3y ago
> Why might engagement be low?
Easy. The whole point of owning stock is to (a) have the right to vote in elections for the Board, (b) have a share of dividends, (c) potentially sell for a profit in the case of an acquisition or IPO.
If the company is private, with no exit in sight: (a) isn't true in your case, as your right to vote is taken away from you, (b) is a pipedream, because the company is either not profitable or because profits are being re-invested into growth.
In a bad economy, where you're trying to build up savings because you have no real idea if you or your partner or someone in your family is going to be laid off in the near future, where exercising options requires both a large cash expenditure on the part of the employee and a huge leap of faith that, in the span of years, there will be some kind of a return...
Stock-based compensation means very different things in VC-controlled and non-VC-controlled companies. Stock-based compensation is "real" in non-VC-controlled companies (be they bootstrapped businesses or large public enterprises) because there's actually a legitimate chance at a dividend issue and/or a real (if small) voice in Board elections. But the value of stock compensation in VC-controlled firms entirely depends on whether the firm is going to be a VC-style success. If it's not a portfolio winner, then the employees don't win either. And employees have a front-row perspective on whether the company is a portfolio winner.
- choppaface 3y ago> And employees have a front-row perspective on whether the company is a portfolio winner. This is often false, especially for ICs. The C-levels in early stage companies hide a lot of key info (intentionally or not). The most material info like the cap table and the relationship with investors (especially record of “no” answers received) is never shared.