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> Would this be a thing that the passkey folks would be OK with? That would ease a lot of my hesitation. I mean, I don't _like_ it (if I'm a passkey folk) as a
by dwaite 4y ago
> Would this be a thing that the passkey folks would be OK with? That would ease a lot of my hesitation.
I mean, I don't _like_ it (if I'm a passkey folk) as a widespread feature. I suspect users may be tricked into giving away the keys to the kingdom.
However, these are generally just API, there are open source projects for security keys, and having an option to hold down a button on insertion to have it turned into a filesystem with a CSV file sounds kinda neat as a bit of hackery.
There are several third party software implementations, such as those built on top of existing password managers which have pre-existing password export/import functionality and tend to document their data vault formats (or have them torn apart in reverse engineering). I suspect this will happen if it hasn't already - it would be better as a command-line tool and not a button with a wordy pop-up.
My hope is that we have independent certifications for relying parties to rely upon, but lack of certification won't lead to such a bespoke implementation being rejected by anyone. Instead, some sites may ask for you to continue using additional factors since they don't understand if your passkey meets their requirements.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- JohnFen 4y agoIf I'm understanding you correctly, then I should be able to write my own manager to behave in a fashion that is in line with my wishes. Is that correct? That would be a nice escape hatch to have available if need be. > Instead, some sites may ask for you to continue using additional factors On the other hand, if that's the result of doing that, then there'd be no gain. I'll end up going through the whole gauntlet anyway.
- dwaite 3y ago> On the other hand, if that's the result of doing that, then there'd be no gain. Yeah, we'll just have to wait to see. Passkeys are just big enough and different enough that I think they are exposing a lot of the holes in existing modeling of authentication. For example, a party may not want to rely on a separate piece of software or cloud-backed data for authentication, but that is the reality for password managers today, as well as text messages and TOTP for a lot of people. What are these factors that would always survive an attacker getting access to a user device and to their cloud account? You quickly find yourself in the realm of issued hardware key fobs and in-person identity verification for account recovery.