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Consciousness means there is "something it's like" to have an experience. It need not be human. That would be needlessly anthropocentric. Animals have a range o
by goatlover 4y ago
Consciousness means there is "something it's like" to have an experience. It need not be human. That would be needlessly anthropocentric. Animals have a range of sensory organs and body plans which differer from humans. Why wouldn't they also have a range of differing conscious experiences? It could be seeing the world in more than three primary colors, hearing frequencies we cannot, detecting the Earth's magnetic field or numerous other things.
We can also imaging making an even wider range of conscious machines someday, if somehow we figured out how to do that, or it was an emergent property of the right sort of architecture. There could be all sorts of conscious experiences we have absolutely no idea about.
- AlbertCory 4y agoYou're begging the question here, which is: What defines 'consciousness'?
- naasking 4y agoIn philosophy it literally means "subjective, qualitative experience". It's almost certain that all animals have it, but of course the qualities they experience will be different.
- AlbertCory 4y agoStill begging the question, i.e. assuming that which you need to prove. How would you prove an animal has a "subjective, qualitative experience"?
- uoaei 4y agoThat is what David Chalmers calls "The Hard Problem of Consciousness".
- naasking 4y agoI think you have it backwards: we would need a reason to think they don't have it, given our shared history and similar biology.
- AlbertCory 4y agook, so anything with our "shared history and similar biology" is assumed to have consciousness? How similar is "similar"? Is it just mammals, or just certain orders, or can organisms in the other branches be assumed to have consciousness too?
- uoaei 4y agoThe question of "where is the line" presumes there even is a line between matter ("objects") that expresses or does not express consciousness, which is also a big and unsubstantiated claim that requires proving. Occam's razor (i.e., our standard scientific apparatus of null vs alternative hypotheses) would seem to indicate it is appropriate to assume there is no difference in kind, only difference in degree, until there is evidence to prove otherwise.
- UIUC_06 4y agoNo need to define it or prove it. Just assume it.
- uoaei 4y agoWhat reason do you have to do so? What purpose would doing that serve? As it stands you are just suggesting complicated, untestable theories. The point above is, that is ultimately pointless. The simplest possible argument goes as follows: I am conscious, and I am made of matter. Everything else that is real is made of matter. There are other minds out there who also have this experience. With no further information, I must assume as the null hypothesis that everything in reality is conscious. An alternative hypothesis may be presented, but it would then need to be proven using reproducible studies and real evidence before we can assume the alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis, per the consensus definition of formalized "science". The rebuttal along epistemological lines goes as follows: you can know you are conscious, but you cannot necessarily know things that are witnessed through physical (limited, imperfect) sensory organs, so there is a wall beyond which we are forced only to postulate truths rather than conclusively prove them. And the response to that is: if we are to progress in our analysis at all, we must postulate certain truths, and it is "best" to postulate only the least complex (in the Kolmogorov sense) assumptions given the data (Occam's Razor). "Best" is defined according to humanity's scientific principles.
- goatlover 4y agoYou can't prove that anyone other than yourself is conscious. It's assumed because other people and animals share similar biological organs and behavior.
- wizofaus 4y agoAlmost certain that all animals have it? The conjecture that, say, a coral polyp or an earthworm (not to mention something like a trichoplax) might have a subjective qualitative experience of existence seems to be an extraordinary claim requiring extraordinary proof. I don't know exactly how similar a brain has to be to a human brain for us to say with reasonable confidence the owner likely has such an experience but I'd be very surprised if included even half of all known animal species. It's possibly not even all (adult) mammals, and indeed not even all humans if you include infants and possibly those with severe brain damage etc.