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WebAuthN is great, but I can't help but feel that Passkeys are actually a step backwards. At least on iOS, there is no way of preventing them from being synced
by lxgr 4y ago
WebAuthN is great, but I can't help but feel that Passkeys are actually a step backwards.
At least on iOS, there is no way of preventing them from being synced to iCloud, which is the opposite of what I want for high-stakes credentials like bank accounts or government e-signatures.
I've tried to raise [1] a related issue (i.e. the inability for relying parties to opt out of credential syncing, if not an explicit requirement to opt in to it) to the W3C WebAuthN working group, but it seems like the working group itself is strongly pro cloud synchronization as well.
Today, Google has sent me an email about their intention to deprecate their (device-bound) iOS authenticator in favor of (iCloud-synchronized) Passkeys, and I guess I'll begrudgingly have to switch to using an external FIDO authenticator instead.
[1] https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/1714 https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/1714
- toomuchtodo 4y agoHow is this different than a password manager with encrypted cloud backup? Your recourse if someone breaks passkeys is legal, not technical. Security must be a balance with functionality, and this is a huge improvement over passwords. (Tangentially, it would be great if we got cryptographic digital identity cards like Estonia has for signatures but that’s more of a long term goal) Cloud sync (encrypted!) is important because your average user needs that convenience and durability of authenticator.
- lxgr 4y agoThe difference is that I can choose my password manager on iOS (and thereby pick my desired security level for password synchronization or opt out of it completely), but not my Passkey synchronization backend: iOS forces these to be stored in iCloud Keychain. (Passkeys are unavailable without iCloud Keychain [1]!) Ideally, there would be a per-passkey UI option to opt out of synchronization at creation time. > Security must be a balance with functionality, and this is a huge improvement over passwords. Sure, but I'm somewhat disappointed that the WebAuthN WG basically forced this huge change of semantics (it's essentially a security vs. availability tradeoff) into relying parties without explicitly collecting their opt-in beforehand, or even providing an ergonomic way of opting out. [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/sign-in-with-passkeys-iphf538ea8d0/ios https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/sign-in-with-passkeys...
- toomuchtodo 4y agoI agree there should be a way to opt out of system level ecosystem passkey sync with a big ol’ “you’re fucked if you don’t back these up somewhere” click through warning.
- lxgr 4y agoThat's exactly what I want, ideally at a per-passkey level. It should also be able for relying parties to express that desire (whether opt-in or opt-out by default). As it is, I think it'll just make banks and governments less likely to adopt passkeys. That's sad, because all in all I think WebAuthN has the potential to have a very positive impact on security globally.
- dwaite 4y agoPutting on my "personal opinion" hat; If a platform gave users this option per credential, and there was any visibility to that choice on the relying party side, the replying party would likely just reject the credentials they don't like outright, and tell people 'go figure out how to twiddle this setting if you want to use your phone here'. Part of the web focus of these APIs mean that they will default to being open and user centric - features that might enable relying parties to block user choice will receive tremendous scrutiny, and proceed very slowly. Sites are expected for now to accept what the user chooses, and do additional steps as necessary to meet their needs. This means passkeys as a whole are not going to be always accepted as a MFA replacement. Even features like hardware attestation are gated by a prompt by some browsers, because some consumer-facing websites went live with code saying "we will only support this one brand of security key". This led to some of the warnings in the document here: https://www.chromium.org/security-keys/ https://www.chromium.org/security-keys/ I can sympathize with the desire of a "footgun mode", which might even lie to the website about whether the credentials are backed up. However, I wouldn't trust something that critical to what is almost going to be a poorly maintained path through the system. Instead, I use (two) Yubikeys for such credentials.
- admax88qqq 4y ago> The difference is that I can choose my password manager on iOS This is what you expect when you buy into the closed Apple ecosystem.
- transpute 4y ago> Cloud sync (encrypted!) is important because your average user needs that convenience and durability of authenticator Local-only iOS+macOS Codebook sync (open-source encrypted! by SQLCipher) provides password and TOTP convenience, durability, transparency, decentralization and fewer supply chain dependencies with one-time purchase. Founded in 2005. https://www.zetetic.net/codebook https://www.zetetic.net/codebook https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher https://github.com/sqlcipher/sqlcipher
- lxgr 4y ago> password and TOTP convenience Passwords and TOTPs are not MITM-safe, WebAuthN/Passkeys implicitly are. (Credentials are bound to a specific RP, i.e. it's impossible to accidentally provide one to the wrong website or a scammer on the phone.)
- transpute 4y agoCodebook links passwords to specific websites/RPs. Some people don't take phone calls from random callers. Can Apple allow existing password managers like Codebook to manage passkeys and synchronization locally?
- lxgr 4y ago> Codebook links passwords to specific websites/RPs. Some people don't take phone calls from random callers. Sure, but passwords are still multiple-use, and sometimes auto-fill fails (often due to websites actively messing with it), requiring me to manually copy-paste the password and exposing me to phishing risk, or that of insecure/malicious applications on my system sniffing the clipboard. > Can Apple allow existing password managers like Codebook to manage passkeys and synchronization locally? Unfortunately not at the moment. There is some hope though, given that Apple has recently added a TOTP API for third-party authenticators, but I'm personally not holding my breath.
- transpute 4y ago> sometimes auto-fill fails For those, Safari share sheet -> "Find in Codebook" = dialog with URL-matched credentials appearing first. > insecure/malicious applications on my system sniffing the clipboard iOS now requires interactive user consent for apps to Paste from clipboard.
- ris 4y ago> Tangentially, it would be great if we got cryptographic digital identity cards like Estonia has for signatures but that’s more of a long term goal Wonderful. Until every second web service starts to require a signature from such digital identity ("age verification" perhaps?) and that's the end of pseudonymity.
- zamadatix 4y agoYou have the option to use a non cloud password sync method today. Best of all, that can sync a single password or private key across multiple vendors. This locking down inside bubbles really needs to go for me to want to use passkeys, I don't want to register 3 separate passkeys for each account I want to register 1 and sync them between my devices.
- toomuchtodo 4y agoYou’re not the target. Your average user who doesn’t even know what a password manager is or doesn’t want to use one is.
- zamadatix 4y agoAgreed I'm not the average user but what does that have to do with the passkeys not being exportable between devices/clouds and instead being forever locked into only that vendor's cloud? The average user does not own only Google or only Apple or only Microsoft products nor do they want to enroll every account for every new device manufacturer key store instead of have options to use something else. This isn't predicated on existing use of a password manager it's just also a downgrade from that aspect of them.
- signal11 4y agoMy cynical assessment of Passkeys is: If Google/Amazon/Apple/Meta/whoever locks your account out, you now lose access everywhere. This isn’t a theoretical risk. You’ll see lots of people complain about this online. Also, Passkey providers now get sweet sweet metadata about your accounts around the web. But yeah, authn is hard to do right. Equally, asking your users to fall into $BIG_PROVIDER’s arms seems wrong. My personal hope is that various accountable nonprofits will begin to offer passkeys.
- hedora 4y agoAgreed. This whole thing seems incredibly user hostile. At the very least, there should be severe legal recourse (criminal liability and also large, material-to-earnings statutory damages) if one of these providers intentionally locks you out of a third-party account. That third party account should be treated like your personal property, and them denying you access to it should be treated like their CEO breaking into your house and stealing your stuff. If they don't want to take on the liability, and it kills the passkey spec, that's fine with me. The current system avoids the issue by allowing people to store credentials in a decentralized way.
- themagician 4y agoLol. If something does happen Google will immediately and repeatedly remind you with every communication that they have no liability. Once your account gets flagged or locked, Google adds the following to damn near every email: “We have concluded the review of the information you’ve submitted. To prevent possible fraud and abuse, your services will remain suspended. It is our policy to not discuss the specific reasons for these suspensions. Note that in the Google <PRODUCT> Terms of Service, we reserve the right to change, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of our services at any time, including availability of a service or any feature, without notice and without liability. We also reserve the right to impose limits on certain Service features or restrict access to some or all of the Services without notice and without liability.”
- lxgr 4y ago> If Google/Amazon/Apple/Meta/whoever locks your account out, you now lose access everywhere. Fortunately, both iOS and Android also support "detachable passkeys" a.k.a. Yubikey and co. ("roaming authenticators" in WebAuthN/FIDO parlance). Unfortunately, only Android is planning to offer [1] a first-party Passkey provider API, because that's what I'll probably be using 99% of the time (finding my external authenticator for every login is frustrating). > Also, Passkey providers now get sweet sweet metadata about your accounts around the web. To my knowledge, both Google's (for Android) and Apple's sync backends are end-to-end encrypted. I'm not sure if that includes the metadata as well as the private keys, though. [1] https://developers.google.com/identity/passkeys/supported-environments https://developers.google.com/identity/passkeys/supported-en...
- sebk 4y agoFor the client-side, the spec is comprehensive in allowing the authenticator to decide whether backups are allowed. In this case it's iOS not exposing that to you as a user. I get why you'd want this, but trusting Apple to store your single-device passkeys for high-stakes credentials but not trusting them for syncing them is somewhat of a very specific threat model I'd say, and definitely not in Apple's own interest to support, to your detriment. RP-side, it's true that RPs can't opt out of credential syncing, but I think that would be weak at best, as the authenticator can do what it wants. The RP can use attestation and the DPK extension to effectively bind authentications to the same originating device.
- lxgr 4y ago> trusting Apple to store your single-device passkeys for high-stakes credentials but not trusting them for syncing them is somewhat of a very specific threat model I'd say I don't think it's that specific of a threat model, to be honest. Many people are logged into iCloud on multiple family devices – are they aware that with Passkeys, by default every device they are logged in to has single-factor access to their entire online life? Additionally, Apple's iCloud security posture has been in the news lately with some quite horrible stories that are very relevant to Passkeys, in my view: https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-iphone-security-theft-passcode-data-privacya-basic-iphone-feature-helps-criminals-steal-your-digital-life-cbf14b1a https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-iphone-security-theft-pas...
- wkat4242 4y agoPersonally I don't want to be dependent on a third party like Google or Apple for my identity. That's never going to be acceptable. If they just accept normal Yubikeys (and multiple at a time for redundancy) that'd work for me but this passkey stuff where the vendor gets to decide things and I don't fully own my credentials is just wrong IMO. I wonder if there's a fully self hosted passkeys option? I'm also opposed to attestation. With TOTP I can use any app I want and back up my keys however I like. But Fido gives a lot of control to websites, they can choose what kind of authenticators or apps to accept. This can make it too easy to get locked into vendor solutions because they are the only ones every website trusts.
- lxgr 4y ago> I wonder if there's a fully self hosted passkeys option? If external authenticators work for you, physical keys (like Yubikey, Solokey etc.) are arguably self-hosted! For on-device passkeys, at least Android is preparing an API for this [1]. I hope that iOS will follow at some point, as well as Firefox (which unfortunately has been quite slow to adopt all aspects of WebAuthN). > I'm also opposed to attestation. With TOTP I can use any app I want and back up my keys however I like. In principle I agree, but some service providers like banks are legally liable for fraud losses (at least in some jurisdictions). I'd say they do have a legitimate interest of being able to verify which authenticators they trust. Of course, it's being already exploited in a pretty much expected way: My government offers a (free to end-users, tax paid) e-signature solution. They support, among other authentication methods, FIDO – but only a very specific authenticator, of which the e-signature service provider is the exclusive reseller in the country... [1] https://developers.google.com/identity/passkeys/supported-environments https://developers.google.com/identity/passkeys/supported-en...
- wkat4242 4y ago> If external authenticators work for you, physical keys (like Yubikey, Solokey etc.) are arguably self-hosted! Yes. And this is what I do with all my personal stuff (though I use the GPG mode on the yubikey, not Fido2). But, because a passkey can be backed up, websites targeting mainly passkeys will be likely to offer only a single authenticator to be enrolled. Of course with hardware authenticators that is not going to work. Lose that one and you're screwed. This is why multi-authenticator support is so important. > For on-device passkeys, at least Android is preparing an API for this Thanks, I'll have a look at that. I'd want it on the PC too though (BSD). But anyway, hopefully it will come. I never really looked at it, as for now the website acceptance part is still so low that it didn't matter anyway. For the ones I use regularly, only Office 365 supports it. I'm not interested in the old FIDO MFA mode, only full passwordless will do. > Firefox (which unfortunately has been quite slow to adopt all aspects of WebAuthN). Yes, this is really a PITA now. They really don't seem to give a ***, they only offer CTAP2 (full FIDO2 + PIN) mode on Windows. Still not working on Mac, Linux, BSD... It's been in this sorry state for years now. > In principle I agree, but some service providers like banks are legally liable for fraud losses (at least in some jurisdictions). I'd say they do have a legitimate interest of being able to verify which authenticators they trust. Banks here already use their own authenticators which they provide anyway, but yeah that's a point. Many other sites shouldn't be able to make such decisions though, IMO. PS: I'm not sure why you are being downvoted, I really appreciated your insightful comment. Especially about the Android option I wasn't aware of.
- sneak 4y agoYou can't even use Passkeys on iOS without using iCloud; if you opt out of iCloud, Passkeys are disabled.
- lxgr 4y agoApparently so; I just saw that as well (and edited my post). Bizarre. Between that and completely removing anonymous attestation (i.e. implicit device binding), it makes me wonder what Apple's motives here really are...
- AlexandrB 4y ago> Today, Google has sent me an email about their intention to deprecate their (device-bound) iOS authenticator Is this the TOTP authenticator app that Google only started actively maintaining again in the last year or so? If that's the case, that's pretty funny timing.