4 ms·

I do think, that trusting thrid-party hardware is always a bad idea. There will never be a safe execution model where you don't own the hardware. Just my opinio

• pa7x1 3y ago
  The point of zk proofs is that you don't have to trust. But you can verify. Without having to rerun the computation yourself, simply verifying the proof which is much cheaper computationally.
• Reisen 3y ago
  Paranoia about untrusted hardware is absolutely warranted but just to try and convince you of what this is trying to do. Imagine you have a file that you have never shown anyone, and some untrusted host wants to convince you they also have that file. They can prove this to you without you revealing the file to them (or them to you) by having them send you the hash of the file that you can compare to your own. If it matches there is an overwhelming probability they also have the file even though you completely distrust them or their execution environment. In other words, you are able to verify the computation (via the hash) was executed even though you don't trust them. Cairo is using similar techniques that let you verify other forms of computation than just hashes using more advanced primitives. The obvious caveat to this just as with hashes is you trust the underlying cryptography is secure.
  • r0l1 3y ago
    Thanks for the explanation. That sounds like a really smart idea. I first thought, that this is based on Intel SGX, which seams to have some security problems (words of a friend working with that technology). I'll have to dig deeper into this topic. Are there any limitations?