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Don't let perfect be the enemy of good. The likelihood and prevalence of deeply low level monitoring is orders of magnitude less than the likelihood of using mo
by freedomben 4y ago
Don't let perfect be the enemy of good. The likelihood and prevalence of deeply low level monitoring is orders of magnitude less than the likelihood of using modern apps and saas where is virtually guaranteed. It's an additive game and you can dramatically reduce invasions, even if you can't eliminate them.
- graderjs 4y ago> likelihood lower Not if we take the lore around mass survey into account (Snowden etc)
- gabesullice 4y agoMy guess is that US surveillance and intelligence agencies operate like many other large government beaurocracies: with high levels of administrative incompetence, mismanagement of resources, unscrupulous decisions in the service of individual risk -avoidance/status-seeking, etc. I suspect Snowden does them a service by making us all feel like we're under a big, scary, watchful eye. In actuality, they probably do collect unholy amounts of data, perhaps even illegally... But they probably don't know how to process it effectively and if they do, they probably struggle to turn those insights into action. It's easy for them to collect Facebook friends and Google searches, not Signal messages and DuckDuckGo queries made in an incognito window. It's easy because they can demand tech companies "hand it over" without actually hiring and assigning the skilled and creative people they'd need to figure out how to overcome the modest obstacles privacy-conscious people erect. If you're a decision maker in one of these orgs, you'll be recognized and praised for cheaply trawling for privacy illiterate pedophiles and easy-to-identify, state-affiliated Twitter bots. OTOH, you might not get promoted for spending hundreds of millions of dollars breaking into end-to-end encrypted convos only to find out that 99.95% of the data is benign and the .05% that's substantively suspicious requires a warrant and an FBI surveillance team to gather enough evidence to actually go to trial. tl;dr: cheap measures to protect your privacy probably go much further than you'd think, because while they can be overcome individually, they're not worth overcoming at scale.
- graderjs 4y agoThe idea that you can assume privacy because whatever country or corporation surveys is incompetent or bureaucratic sounds reasonable, but what's the probability of that? It's not 100%. If privacy is important, assume compromise and work around it, sounds like the more secure strategy.
- autoexec 4y ago> It's easy for them to collect Facebook friends and Google searches, not Signal messages and DuckDuckGo queries made in an incognito window. It's entirely unclear that it's difficult for them to collect duckduckgo searches (Why assume they wouldn't collect the info from duckduckgo?). Specific signal messages might be harder, but even signal collects and stores sensitive info (like a list of your contacts) forever in the cloud and in ways that could be easy for the government to get their hands on. Cell phones are basically designed to leak your info like a sieve and allow google/apple to do whatever they want (or are ordered to do) at any time without notice to users anyway, so anything done on them is probably capable of being observed and/or recorded. You're right that most of the time it's probably not worth the effort to go after everyone for everything, but as long as they're collecting and keeping the data they can always decide to spend a little more effort if you become a problem for them. I agree, people should take whatever steps you can to protect themselves whenever you can, since it can only help, but man, "Take care to never become inconvenient to those in power and hope they are incompetent when they finally come for you" is sure no comfort.
- TimTheTinker 4y agoSee https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35698547 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35698547 Even at the hardware level we have real examples of exfiltration.
- 0l 4y agoWhile perhaps true in many cases, this example was untrue: https://blog.brixit.nl/nitrokey-dissapoints-me/ https://blog.brixit.nl/nitrokey-dissapoints-me/
- transpute 4y agoNitrokey article improvement: https://twitter.com/grapheneos/status/1651601840520278018 https://twitter.com/grapheneos/status/1651601840520278018 > Per our request, NitroKey has fixed one of the main issues in nitrokey.com/news/2023/smar…. XTRA downloads are done by xtra-daemon in the OS, not firmware. It also does use HTTPS by default, but the OS can override the default URLs via gps.conf and some OSes do override to HTTP URLs ... NitroKey is correct that xtra-daemon has support for sending information on the device including device model, serial number, etc. They're also correct that the user is never asked about it. It's less of an issue than SUPL which sends nearby cell towers, phone number and IMSI.