Except no, at the time of the second crash, there had been over 20 reports of un-commanded nose down inputs by pilots. The two flights just didn't manage to dia

Except no, at the time of the second crash, there had been over 20 reports of un-commanded nose down inputs by pilots. The two flights just didn't manage to diagnose the issue or turn off MCAS before it crashed the aircraft. There was IIRC 8~16 hours of training that was intended to be mandated, but Boeing told airlines that training was not necessary. So many (not all) pilots never learned the deeper mechanisms of MCAS. This would reduce costs, and increase desirability of the aircraft. But it gets even worse! The FAA approved Boeing's request to remove a description of MCAS from the aircraft manual! So no, most pilots wouldn't even be able to learn about it even if they wanted to! There was 0 redundancy. The MCAS was directed by ONE SINGLE AoA (Angle of Attack) SENSOR! No backups! Even worse! Boeing was aware of the problems as of 2016! They even knew MCAS violated Boeing's own design documents and rules for the max8! And yet here you are blaming the pilots instead of the money grubbers at the top.