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TOR has a blog post up about exactly what they've been able to determine about what Iran is doing: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encry

TOR has a blog post up about exactly what they've been able to determine about what Iran is doing: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encrypted-network-traffic https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encry... Regarding HTTPS, it appears they detect and disrupt the SSL handshake. For those who can't access TOR's site, it may be useful to quote their post in full: “Over the past two days we've been hearing from, and working with, a number of Iranians having difficulty using Tor from inside Iran. It seems the Iranian government has ramped up censorship in three ways: deep packet inspection (dpi) of SSL traffic, selective blocking of IP Address and TCP port combinations, and some keyword filtering. For instance, they have partially blocked access to Tor's website, torproject.org, via IP address (such as 86.59.30.36) and port 443 (which is the HTTPS port). The third level of blocking is by keywords, such as searching for the word 'tor' via regular, non-encrypted search engine websites. The blocks on SSL are not complete and not nationwide. Where blocking is in place, initial investigations show they are identifying the beginning of the SSL handshake and simply interrupting the handshake. We continue to research and investigate solutions with the assumption that SSL will eventually be blocked nationwide inside Iran. Our goal is to defeat their dpi signatures and allow tor to work by default. The Iran Media Program has posted their thoughts on what is happening from a journalist's perspective. So far, it seems the majority of Tor users are not affected by these blocks. Iran is still the #2 country based on direct usage, https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&country=ir#... https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users.... This number is on the decline, however. More details to follow as we have them.”

charlieok 15y ago
“Update 2011-02-10 18:05 UTC: We are working on making our obfuscating proxy more stable and easier to deploy. If you can compile code, following these directions will help. We're also working on Amazon EC2 instances of obfsproxy for point and click deployment.” “these directions” links to an email from Jacob Appelbaum: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-February/023070.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-Februar... “ [tor-talk] Help users in Iran reach the internet Fri Feb 10 11:41:50 UTC 2012 Hi, In the last 48 hours a major campaign of filtering has started in Iran - it started slow and now appears to be that nearly all SSL/TLS traffic is blocked on a few major Iranian ISPs. Details are rather rough but we're working on some solutions - we've long had an ace up our sleeves for this exact moment in the arms race but it's perhaps come while the User Interface edges are a bit rough still. Here's the deal - we need people to run Tor bridges but a special kind of Tor bridge, one that does a kind of traffic camouflaging - we call it an obfuscated bridge. It's not easy to set up just yet because we were not ready to deploy this for everyone yet; it lacks a lot of analysis and it might even only last for a few days at the rate the arms race is progressing, if you could call it progress. There are highly technical instructions here: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.html.en https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.h... Currently if you run such a bridge, you'll either need to manually tell us (via email to tor-assistants at torproject.org ) about it or you'll need to share these bridges with people you want to help directly. It's a pain and we're working on it. Here's a bug report where we're working around the clock to get stuff going in a user friendly manner: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5009#comment:17 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5009#comment... This kind of help is not for the technically faint of heart but it's absolutely needed for people in Iran, right now. It's likely that more than ~50,000 - ~60,000 Tor users may drop offline. Watch this graph for an idea of the censorship impact of directly connecting Tor users: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&events=on&dpi=72#direct-users https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users... Here's the same graph but for Tor bridge users in Iran: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&dpi=72#bridge-users https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users... We're working on easy to use client software and if you're in Iran or need one desperately, please email help at rt.torproject.org. We'll try to get you a working obfsproxy bridge address and working client software. All the best, Jacob ”

charlieok 15y ago

“Update 2011-02-10 18:05 UTC: We are working on making our obfuscating proxy more stable and easier to deploy. If you can compile code, following these directions will help. We're also working on Amazon EC2 instances of obfsproxy for point and click deployment.” “these directions” links to an email from Jacob Appelbaum: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-February/023070.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-Februar... “ [tor-talk] Help users in Iran reach the internet Fri Feb 10 11:41:50 UTC 2012 Hi, In the last 48 hours a major campaign of filtering has started in Iran - it started slow and now appears to be that nearly all SSL/TLS traffic is blocked on a few major Iranian ISPs. Details are rather rough but we're working on some solutions - we've long had an ace up our sleeves for this exact moment in the arms race but it's perhaps come while the User Interface edges are a bit rough still. Here's the deal - we need people to run Tor bridges but a special kind of Tor bridge, one that does a kind of traffic camouflaging - we call it an obfuscated bridge. It's not easy to set up just yet because we were not ready to deploy this for everyone yet; it lacks a lot of analysis and it might even only last for a few days at the rate the arms race is progressing, if you could call it progress. There are highly technical instructions here: https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.html.en https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-instructions.h... Currently if you run such a bridge, you'll either need to manually tell us (via email to tor-assistants at torproject.org ) about it or you'll need to share these bridges with people you want to help directly. It's a pain and we're working on it. Here's a bug report where we're working around the clock to get stuff going in a user friendly manner: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5009#comment:17 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5009#comment... This kind of help is not for the technically faint of heart but it's absolutely needed for people in Iran, right now. It's likely that more than ~50,000 - ~60,000 Tor users may drop offline. Watch this graph for an idea of the censorship impact of directly connecting Tor users: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&events=on&dpi=72#direct-users https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=direct-users... Here's the same graph but for Tor bridge users in Iran: https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-11-12&end=2012-05-10&country=ir&dpi=72#bridge-users https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users... We're working on easy to use client software and if you're in Iran or need one desperately, please email help at rt.torproject.org. We'll try to get you a working obfsproxy bridge address and working client software. All the best, Jacob ”