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So your threat model is a sovereign state able to subpoena cloud data. Under this model, if Google gets a court order to root-break a specific phone (push mali

by ddalex 3y ago

So your threat model is a sovereign state able to subpoena cloud data. Under this model, if Google gets a court order to root-break a specific phone (push malicious update), they will be forced to, and that's all the legal framework necessary, so end-to-end encryption doesn't protect you in this case either.

xp84 3y ago
In the US at least, there’s not a lot of precedent for forcing a company to do something like that. (Yet.) Saying hand over your user’s files is demanding information. Compelling them to write and distribute malware is a lot closer to compelling speech. A 1st amendment problem.
dtech 3y ago
That's a lot more detectable, and has a high risk of coming out, see e.g. Pegasus. Cloud access is nearly invisible.