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The standard mantra for physical key-based 2FA has always been "register two keys and keep one in a safe", which seems doable for important accounts (like banks
by jeroenhd 4y ago
The standard mantra for physical key-based 2FA has always been "register two keys and keep one in a safe", which seems doable for important accounts (like banks and government stuff) but no way am I going to get a key out of my safe when I want to order a replacement part on JoesDiscountDishwasherParts.biz. I really wish there was a way to register your backup key through your primary key.
Luckily, FIDO2 can fix a lot of these problems. People who don't have significant security needs can use a trusted service (currently Apple, Google, and a few small companies) rather than a physical device. Lose your phone? As long as you can get your account onto a new one, you can still access all of your stuff.
Once this type of auth will take off, I can imagine a business model for a FIDO2 company that focuses on customer service. The only problem with the system right now is that if you can't log in to your Apple/Google/whatever account, there's no recovery. Try contacting customer support and see how long it takes until they just block your number, because there is nothing they can do.
Having a business where you can go to a physical office and show up with ID so you can get your account back would solve this problem. Recovery would still be a massive pain, but it's better than spending years on a legal battle like some people trying to get their pictures back from their cloud providers after getting locked out.
- nmca 4y agoWait - the way this works is you have a backup key, if you lose your primary you replace it using your backup. NB this is only needed when you move to a new device with a new secure enclave too, so at no point is this pizza situation likely.
- Semaphor 4y agoYeah, but you need to add all those secrets to your backup key. So you need to get it out every time you register somewhere.
- GTP 4y agoI have to admit that I don't own an hardware security key. But since those let you use public key cryptography to login, you could at least theoretically use the same public key for multiple services. Whether the FIDO2 protocol lets you do that or not, I admit I don't know.
- donmcronald 4y agoThe keys are baked in to the devices and are tamper proof. So two devices means you have two different public keys. I use YubiKeys for accounts I consider important and they're a pretty huge hassle compared to a password manager. I'm also scared to get rid of any of the old ones I've got just in case they're linked to an account I forgot about.
- GTP 4y agoI thought you could generate a key on your PC and store it inside the YubiKey, are you sure it isn't possible?
- donmcronald 4y agoIt’s possible, at least for GPG. I’m not sure about WebAuthn. Regardless, generating the key right on the device is the most secure way of doing it. It’s also hard to manage keys you’re loading yourself. Once I loaded a private key onto my YubiKey and accidentally failed to backup the private key because I used the wrong syntax when I exported it. I didn’t even realize until I got a new YubiKey and went to load my GPG keys onto it. I was only using it for signing, so it wasn’t a huge deal, but if I’d been using it for encryption / decryption it would have been a disaster.
- lll-o-lll 4y agoIt doesn’t, which would make disaster recovery a huge pain. You would have to register your backup key for every account you have. The Apple/google “passkey” approach lets you use WebAuthn while having encrypted, cloud stored, private key escrow. It is much more convenient. Obviously with the downsides that implies.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- tzs 4y ago> Having a business where you can go to a physical office and show up with ID so you can get your account back would solve this problem. I've wanted something similar, combined with a tree approach to account recovery where the effort for recovery can vary depending on the importance of the account. Say I lose access to my McDonald's account. That's not a very important account. It just contains some reward points that would get me some discounts at McDonald's. That account would be a leaf on the recovery tree. It's parent node would be my email account, currently at Fastmail. Recovery of my McDonald's account would just require responding to a recovery email McDonald's would send to my email. My email account is much more important. Its parent node would be my domain name, currently registered at Namecheap. Recovery of my email account at Fastmail would involve demonstrating to Fastmail that I control my email domain. My domain name is so important, since it is in the ultimate recovery path for so many descendant nodes, it would probably have at least two parent nodes (I didn't say anything about the tree having to be a binary tree). They would be businesses that can verify my ID in person using government documents like my passport, and provide a way for me to prove that identity to third parties. Banks would be good candidates to run such a business. Post offices would also be good candidates. The protocol between the root verifiers and their direct child nodes could be a zero knowledge protocol so that the child node doesn't get your real identity and the root verifier doesn't know who the child node is. All the root needs to learn is that you are being verified for some site, and all the site needs to learn is that you are the same person who set up the account. Such a zero knowledge protocol could also be good for age verification, which more and more jurisdictions are requiring from some sites. With such a protocol between the age verifiers and the sites you could have age verification without giving up anonymous accounts.
- Zababa 4y ago> My domain name is so important, since it is in the ultimate recovery path for so many descendant nodes, it would probably have at least two parent nodes (I didn't say anything about the tree having to be a binary tree). If your domain name can have multiple descendant nodes and multiple parent nodes, is that still a tree?
- tzs 4y ago
- donmcronald 4y ago> Luckily, FIDO2 can fix a lot of these problems. People who don't have significant security needs can use a trusted service (currently Apple, Google, and a few small companies) rather than a physical device. And from the article: > “If I'm Google implementing passkeys, I cede a lot of control to Apple if my user is on an Apple device, I cede a lot of control to Microsoft if the user is on a Windows device, I cede a lot of UX control to Android and browsers,” To me it sounds like Google, Microsoft, Apple, etc. seizing the last bits of control away from the average person. Everyone will be absolutely beholden to a few big tech companies. Using a fake name or birthday on accounts will be unthinkable because a locked account will mean losing access to your life and the only way to get it back will be to verify your identity which better match the info you provided initially. We used to have outrage over things like using real names and now we've somehow fallen to the point where everyone is going to mindlessly accept a scheme that could easily morph into verified identities managed by private companies. Participating online will require a verified identity and everything you do will be mapped back to it.
- jareklupinski 4y agoshout out to all my friends celebrating their 123rd birthdays this year, according my Apple/iCloud shared calendars (1900 cohort)
- TheNewsIsHere 4y agoYubico has proffered a standard enhancement designed to enable FIDO keys to “automatically” enroll a paired backup when you enroll a primary key. They wrote about it here in 2020: https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protocol-extension-to-simplify-backup-security-keys/ https://www.yubico.com/blog/yubico-proposes-webauthn-protoco... I’m not clear on whether it has gained any traction, and it’s not something I see a lot of my peers in security aware of.