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More directly they are both about prediction. If I can accurately predict the next X bits I don't need to store those. If I can accurately predict the next X

More directly they are both about prediction. If I can accurately predict the next X bits I don't need to store those. If I can accurately predict the next X bits of information that will happen after a decision I can make a reasoned decision. That's it. That's the link as plainly as possible. If you want more detail read up on arithmetic coding and how it can take predictions as in input to data compression and then Marcus Hutters papers on general purpose AI requiring the exact same thing.

motohagiography 4y ago
Years ago at the office I had a conversation about complexity where I asked someome who knew more than me whether feature extraction, similarity metrics, kolmolgorov complexity, and graph isomorphism were really all just the same information encoding and compression problems, and he said something like, "well, sure, but that means everything is just a compression problem" which I thought was pretty funny. This author seems caught in a similar loop. On a related epistemological loop - I was just using the openai tool to query some of Kripke's modal logic ideas, and find whether they could be expressed in code (they can, for a given theorem in modal logic, gpt can represent the theorems in lisp if you want), and what struck me about the whole premise was that he invented not so much a broader logic that was revelatory or quantitatively truth finding - but a neutralizing, critical logic designed to dilute others. Gödel's theorems are apparently for logics that can produce arithmetic, which seems basic an necessary, but Kripke figured, "fine, what about logics that don't produce arithmetic?" (the result is basically digraphs.) Apparently there's nothing Kripke produced that can't be produced symbolically with digraphs, and like the author's compression example, it's just digraphs all the way down. Same flaw. Kripke's ideas seem like fun philosophical ideas, but they're more of a scheme backfitted to a familiar ideology, and then you see his ideas come up often again as foundations for other less rigorous and less quantitative theories. If you've ever heard people use the word "modality," they're attempting to control a discussion using some of these same techniqes in what they percieve as a power struggle without any need for alignment to truth or reality. By adding parallel logical systems without the same criteria for consistency, Kripke created a tool for infinite uncertainty whose main feature is to neutralize the concept of logical truth in its subjects. I think it will be immensely useful in creating AI's, but it will also be the basis for the truly dangerous parts of it. Modal logic does not relate to the universe or need external consistency, it only exists as a kind of solvent for another existing logic it effectively criticizes. If there were such a thing, I think it may be a recipe for actual evil. Anyway, good luck with the "everything is compression" thing, and even the basilisk that is Kripke's digraphs dressed up as ontology. I don't think there is a there there, but if we get to talk about this stuff, there may still be some fun to be had.

motohagiography 4y ago

Years ago at the office I had a conversation about complexity where I asked someome who knew more than me whether feature extraction, similarity metrics, kolmolgorov complexity, and graph isomorphism were really all just the same information encoding and compression problems, and he said something like, "well, sure, but that means everything is just a compression problem" which I thought was pretty funny. This author seems caught in a similar loop. On a related epistemological loop - I was just using the openai tool to query some of Kripke's modal logic ideas, and find whether they could be expressed in code (they can, for a given theorem in modal logic, gpt can represent the theorems in lisp if you want), and what struck me about the whole premise was that he invented not so much a broader logic that was revelatory or quantitatively truth finding - but a neutralizing, critical logic designed to dilute others. Gödel's theorems are apparently for logics that can produce arithmetic, which seems basic an necessary, but Kripke figured, "fine, what about logics that don't produce arithmetic?" (the result is basically digraphs.) Apparently there's nothing Kripke produced that can't be produced symbolically with digraphs, and like the author's compression example, it's just digraphs all the way down. Same flaw. Kripke's ideas seem like fun philosophical ideas, but they're more of a scheme backfitted to a familiar ideology, and then you see his ideas come up often again as foundations for other less rigorous and less quantitative theories. If you've ever heard people use the word "modality," they're attempting to control a discussion using some of these same techniqes in what they percieve as a power struggle without any need for alignment to truth or reality. By adding parallel logical systems without the same criteria for consistency, Kripke created a tool for infinite uncertainty whose main feature is to neutralize the concept of logical truth in its subjects. I think it will be immensely useful in creating AI's, but it will also be the basis for the truly dangerous parts of it. Modal logic does not relate to the universe or need external consistency, it only exists as a kind of solvent for another existing logic it effectively criticizes. If there were such a thing, I think it may be a recipe for actual evil. Anyway, good luck with the "everything is compression" thing, and even the basilisk that is Kripke's digraphs dressed up as ontology. I don't think there is a there there, but if we get to talk about this stuff, there may still be some fun to be had.