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One assumes that this line of reasoning might easily lead one to, say, storm a capital? I mean, if you thought you could side-step moral problems in the name of
by erulabs 3y ago
One assumes that this line of reasoning might easily lead one to, say, storm a capital? I mean, if you thought you could side-step moral problems in the name of the greater good - wouldn't it just be a matter of convincing yourself?
If you were 100% convinced society was a great evil, and you also were told that exceptional men do not concern themselves with small evils, and to not feel "excess guilt", could you not imagine committing horrendous evil?
I guess my question is: do you think the Nazis justified their actions differently than how you've explained one can justify small immoralities? I hate to invoke the Nazis or Stalin, but it seems totally justified to me. I assume plenty of Nazis thought their government was legitimate, which in turn made their job as executioner legitimate. They were only following orders in the name of the greater good after all!
Raskolnikov, you have to remember, was a member of a terribly corrupt society. There were no state executioners and the justice system was terribly rigged. No one was coming to punish Alyona Ivanovna - it was up to our "exceptional" hero.
- majormajor 3y ago> and you also were told that exceptional men do not concern themselves with small evils I personally find some immorality in whoever is telling people this. This is that gray area, why is "going along" preferable to not; and when is that line actually crossed? But Rothbard's position, to me, has it's own mountains of gray area that could often lead one to taking no action and allowing evil instead of acting against it through ones own "sin". The Nazi populace, here, rather than the Nazi soldiers and officials. Perhaps that's what I missed: is there a blame in Rothbard's math that accrues to inaction? I know you aren't advocating as doing nothing, but to me that seems like it would be a common individual decision from the "these actions are all one sin or another" calculus. What's your take on this flip of that war/"just following orders" scenario: would it be a smaller evil for an external country to assassinate Putin with the goal of trying to end the war in Ukraine with less overall death, than the evil of supporting Ukraine in what then becomes a longer, bloodier war? (Or would supporting Ukraine not be seen as evil despite leading to deaths?) EDIT: for the "storm the capital" example - does that action come from failed moral reasoning, or from beliefs that differ from those of those who wouldn't storm the capital? Couldn't they arrive at "this is a sin, but it is still the least bad option" even in that Rothbardian sense?
- erulabs 3y agoFor some context, Rothbard is really hard on the volunteerism angle, he is a philosopher searching for non-violent ways of formulating society. He is one of the stronger "proto-libertarians" in my view because he recognizes that undoing existing social programs is just as arbitrary as creating them: forcing a government to be small requires a powerful government. Hence the Ouroboros reference; you can't escape the violence! Rothbard isn't saying "do nothing", he's really saying "it's impossible to undo the mistake" - a statue can never be torn down without incurring more violence. Re: Putin and Ukraine - this is a perfect example really. It would be a small evil to assassinate Putin. So we must accept we can not have a government that cannot commit evil. This line of thinking is enough to turn most libertarians or pacifist/volunteerist into plain old republicans or democrats (which is one reason why there are not many moderate libertarians). I fully support Ukraine - and to support them - we must do a bit of evil. However: whoever actually pulls a trigger and kills another human being, even a mass murderer, is still a murderer themselves. If the solution to killing is killing, we will never solve the problem. So long as we accept that, we can have a chat about the conflict in Europe! Re: The capital: Yes! So we have to accept that no one committing violence (either defending or attacking the capital) is morally clean in the entire situation, and that everyones argument for committing violence needs to be understood and judged. This is, to my continued amazement, actually exactly what has happened. We do this for mass murderers and terrorists and people who rape other people. It's exceptional and I don't think we're proud enough as a species of what we've done. Throwing out our "gray area" and replacing it with moral certainty is the only real danger! Edit: I've enjoyed this chat! TY! I should get back to work now xD
- majormajor 3y ago> we have to accept that no one committing violence (either defending or attacking the capital) is morally clean in the entire situation, and that everyones argument for committing violence needs to be understood and judged There's a certain place here where we see this the same way and are just positioning our definition of sin/moral culpability on opposite sides of this judgement. Was the sin justified by the argument, or does the justness of the argument make it not a sin? > If the solution to killing is killing, we will never solve the problem. This bit, though, is still fuzzy to me. My lens is a bit different in terms of "responding to the situation" a bit narrower than "solving the problem"? Possibly some residual Christianity at play, believing that "solving the problem" is incompatible with human nature. But similarly I'm generally sympathetic to the "just following orders" claim especially when you extend it to the "I'm just a member of society, not in the chain of command at all", and so would find it hard to support a post-Civil-War action of "throw every white Southerner in jail for the rest of their lives"... even though I also think the ultimate retreat of the US federal government in the face of ongoing southern insurgency caused a LOT of future evils.