Things like local hardware access require things like entitlements, ongoing consent, external accountability, and at least rudimentary protections from supply c

Things like local hardware access require things like entitlements, ongoing consent, external accountability, and at least rudimentary protections from supply chain attacks - all things the web is historically bad at managing. Web Extensions for an example have all been pushed into stores for auditing purposes, because otherwise their functionality can and has changed via automatic updates, going from useful functionality to horrible privacy trainwrecks. > Sure, I agree, not every site should have access to these sensors/capabilities. There are privacy risks of turning them on. But they're also excellent capabilities, that really help users do interesting things. Sure, but they are still harmful. For instance, there is no body that says which websites are allowed to manage USB because they are Arduino Maker sites dispatching firmwares, and which ones are not allowed to because they'll attempt to zero day some mobile phone OS while it charges. And there is no technical protection against the former site suddenly becoming the latter via acquisition or exploit. This is why the native app security and privacy models are fundamentally different from the web models - a store can require entry into a private contract by a real-world entity who is accountable (potentially criminally), of software under audit control. Websites can be by random people outside any legal accountability. On iOS, one of the major differences is that there is no expectation that people will doing ongoing management of granted permissions to a website. For this reason, things like geolocation access have to be re-granted periodically. This is also a reason why push notifications (as a more durable permission) require the PWA to be "promoted" to an app on the Home Screen on iOS.