The use of a memory hard KDF like Argon2 is hardly a panacea for something like disk encryption. If your passphrase is compute time hard already, the advantage

The use of a memory hard KDF like Argon2 is hardly a panacea for something like disk encryption. If your passphrase is compute time hard already, the advantage of using something memory hard is unlikely to be more than a factor of a thousand or so. Adding even a single diceware generated word to a passphrase increases the difficulty by a factor of 7776. So passphrase length is by far the dominant factor. There is a faction out there that claims that Argon2 is not as good as cache hard functions for the case where the user is only going to be willing to wait second or less. That's a reasonable assumption so it would probably be a good idea to evaluate more than just Argon2 for any particular application. Yes I know that Argon2 won a contest, but such contests are followed by a much longer evaluation period.