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I'm not following. So we have to keep to the locked app store-only model because if we allowed sideloading....people could jailbreak their devices and apps coul

I'm not following. So we have to keep to the locked app store-only model because if we allowed sideloading....people could jailbreak their devices and apps could extract secrets? I don't follow. >>that'll just create a market for pre-jailbroken devices. I don't understand - people will get pre-jailbroken devices so they can be hacked easier? The whole idea with forcing apple to allow sideloading is that you can be on the very latest, most secure iOS version and sideload apps.

jeroenhd 4y ago
I think you misunderstand. The secure token you mention isn't secure if it's part of your app, like any other API key or password. Fake apps will just extract that token from the real app and insert it into their own code.
- gambiting 4y ago
  And how exactly will they do that on a non-jailbroken fully updated iOS installation? Not to mention that iOS apps keep those kinds of secrets in the Secure Enclave and you can't get anything out of it unless you are the app that put the secret in there in the first place - that doesn't change whether apple allows sideloading or not. If you need a jailbreak to break that protection then this isn't something that will affect your "normal" user like many here are worried about. Normal iOS protections will be more than enough.
  - JimDabell 4y ago
    > And how exactly will they do that on a non-jailbroken fully updated iOS installation? This is irrelevant because banks need to support people using older versions of iOS as well. > Not to mention that iOS apps keep those kinds of secrets in the Secure Enclave iOS doesn’t store tokens in the Secure Enclave. It can generate keys and use them to sign things, but keys and tokens are different things. The Secure Enclave isn’t a generic secret store, it has very specific, limited functionality. Are you perhaps mixing it up with the keychain? Also, you didn’t answer the question: > What kind of token? How does it obtain it? It’s still unclear whether you are thinking of a static token bundled with the application or a per-user token obtained during first use. In the former case attackers can just download the IPA and extract it themselves without even thinking about attacking a user’s device. In the latter case, you need a mechanism to distribute tokens to untrusted devices, so that is the most likely entry point for an attack, not trying to obtain an existing token after the fact.

jeroenhd 4y ago

I think you misunderstand. The secure token you mention isn't secure if it's part of your app, like any other API key or password. Fake apps will just extract that token from the real app and insert it into their own code.

gambiting 4y ago
And how exactly will they do that on a non-jailbroken fully updated iOS installation? Not to mention that iOS apps keep those kinds of secrets in the Secure Enclave and you can't get anything out of it unless you are the app that put the secret in there in the first place - that doesn't change whether apple allows sideloading or not. If you need a jailbreak to break that protection then this isn't something that will affect your "normal" user like many here are worried about. Normal iOS protections will be more than enough.
- JimDabell 4y ago
  > And how exactly will they do that on a non-jailbroken fully updated iOS installation? This is irrelevant because banks need to support people using older versions of iOS as well. > Not to mention that iOS apps keep those kinds of secrets in the Secure Enclave iOS doesn’t store tokens in the Secure Enclave. It can generate keys and use them to sign things, but keys and tokens are different things. The Secure Enclave isn’t a generic secret store, it has very specific, limited functionality. Are you perhaps mixing it up with the keychain? Also, you didn’t answer the question: > What kind of token? How does it obtain it? It’s still unclear whether you are thinking of a static token bundled with the application or a per-user token obtained during first use. In the former case attackers can just download the IPA and extract it themselves without even thinking about attacking a user’s device. In the latter case, you need a mechanism to distribute tokens to untrusted devices, so that is the most likely entry point for an attack, not trying to obtain an existing token after the fact.