4 ms·

If you've read Fenyman's appendix to the report on the accident and investigation (http://www.ralentz.com/old/space/feynman-report.html http://www.ralentz.com/o

If you've read Fenyman's appendix to the report on the accident and investigation (http://www.ralentz.com/old/space/feynman-report.html http://www.ralentz.com/old/space/feynman-report.html), I don't see how you can possibly believe that the decisions made around the Challenger launch were made with the right process.

damoncali 15y ago
I have read it, and I do think there are defects in the processes. But what to you do about it? I'm sure there are many more unknown vulnerabilities in the orbiter that were never found out, but you keep trying and fixing.
- lurker17 15y ago
  There is an obvious difference between "unknown vulnerabilities" and "known vulnerabilities"
- mistermann 15y ago
  Your willfully ignorant (and I don't mean that in a crude, insulting way) responses here lead me to think there remains some very serious cultural issues within NASA.
  - damoncali 15y ago
    I think you've read something I didn't write. What you call willful ignorance I call a realistic assessment and acceptance of the risks of pioneering space flight. Nobody is forced into an orbiter - people BEG for the opportunity. We gave them that opportunity, working in good faith to the best of our ability. Sometimes it doesn't work out. Sometimes things break. Sometimes people screw up. We all know the risks. You can sit on the porch with a near 100% safety record or you can give it a try. Your choice.
    - kahawe 15y ago
      Actually I have to say I am with "mistermann" on this... you make it sound like there is no other way. I can totally accept and understand that it cannot be all that safe to sit you on tons of rocket fuel, fire you into the oxygen-less and freezing depth of space and then hope you somehow make it onto another planet AND then do the same stunt from there back to earth. I get it, I can also understand the trade-off between "making it 100% safe" and "otherwise we'd never get lift-off". What I cannot understand is: an unknown, unforseen contingency is a completely different thing than an engineer pointing out "this WILL fail, it will blow up and I have proof" and there really should not be any excuse for ignoring a warning like this... yes, you cannot make it 100% safe but you should at least aim to make it as safe as humanly possible given your current level of technology and knowledge... so, in my book overriding an engineer saying "this WILL fail and it'll blow up" is actually negligent man slaughter. When I get into my car in the morning and don't care that the brakes aren't working even my mechanic told me my brake lines were cut, what would you call that?
      - lutorm 15y ago
        While this sentiment is understandable, it's not justified unless you know how many times people said "this will fail" and it didn't. We only have definite data on this one statement. You can not from that data conclude (I'm not saying there isn't other data) that this was negligent. If every engineer who disagreed with something said "this thing is going to blow up", eventually one would be right. But you can not then infer that that individual was any different than the others and that people should have known this. It's the "monkeys on typewriters" fallacy.
        drucken 15y ago
        This is science and engineering not statistics. It is not a numbers game or "monkeys on typewriters" or how many bug reports we can file on the same issue to get said issue fixed! At the end of the day, if even ONE person demonstrates scientific or engineering knowledge that shows a serious safety concern, then why would you actively choose to ignore it. Period. NASA management - whether it be by organisational process and or personally identifiable decision making - failed in their responsibilities in spectacular fashion!

damoncali 15y ago

I have read it, and I do think there are defects in the processes. But what to you do about it? I'm sure there are many more unknown vulnerabilities in the orbiter that were never found out, but you keep trying and fixing.

lurker17 15y ago
There is an obvious difference between "unknown vulnerabilities" and "known vulnerabilities"
mistermann 15y ago
Your willfully ignorant (and I don't mean that in a crude, insulting way) responses here lead me to think there remains some very serious cultural issues within NASA.
- damoncali 15y ago
  I think you've read something I didn't write. What you call willful ignorance I call a realistic assessment and acceptance of the risks of pioneering space flight. Nobody is forced into an orbiter - people BEG for the opportunity. We gave them that opportunity, working in good faith to the best of our ability. Sometimes it doesn't work out. Sometimes things break. Sometimes people screw up. We all know the risks. You can sit on the porch with a near 100% safety record or you can give it a try. Your choice.
  - kahawe 15y ago
    Actually I have to say I am with "mistermann" on this... you make it sound like there is no other way. I can totally accept and understand that it cannot be all that safe to sit you on tons of rocket fuel, fire you into the oxygen-less and freezing depth of space and then hope you somehow make it onto another planet AND then do the same stunt from there back to earth. I get it, I can also understand the trade-off between "making it 100% safe" and "otherwise we'd never get lift-off". What I cannot understand is: an unknown, unforseen contingency is a completely different thing than an engineer pointing out "this WILL fail, it will blow up and I have proof" and there really should not be any excuse for ignoring a warning like this... yes, you cannot make it 100% safe but you should at least aim to make it as safe as humanly possible given your current level of technology and knowledge... so, in my book overriding an engineer saying "this WILL fail and it'll blow up" is actually negligent man slaughter. When I get into my car in the morning and don't care that the brakes aren't working even my mechanic told me my brake lines were cut, what would you call that?
    - lutorm 15y ago
      While this sentiment is understandable, it's not justified unless you know how many times people said "this will fail" and it didn't. We only have definite data on this one statement. You can not from that data conclude (I'm not saying there isn't other data) that this was negligent. If every engineer who disagreed with something said "this thing is going to blow up", eventually one would be right. But you can not then infer that that individual was any different than the others and that people should have known this. It's the "monkeys on typewriters" fallacy.
      - drucken 15y ago
        This is science and engineering not statistics. It is not a numbers game or "monkeys on typewriters" or how many bug reports we can file on the same issue to get said issue fixed! At the end of the day, if even ONE person demonstrates scientific or engineering knowledge that shows a serious safety concern, then why would you actively choose to ignore it. Period. NASA management - whether it be by organisational process and or personally identifiable decision making - failed in their responsibilities in spectacular fashion!