3 ms·

why can't we admit that we don't know? creatures who have photoreceptors only, and not eyes, have this same swapping. we don't know why this happens. period.

kerkeslager 4y ago
I agree that we don't know, but we can weight the different possible explanations by plausibility. The article's explanation would explain all the facts we do know, so we can reasonably weight that as a very plausible explanation. I'll also add that the article says, 'Now, this all makes sense mathematically, but it’s important to note that we don’t know for certain that this is truly why our brains and bodies are connected the way they are. There is very little biological research on this intriguing question. The convenient dodge often heard is that the scientific method tells us “what,” not “why.”' The GP's explanation doesn't explain why worms have criss-crossed nervous systems despite not having retinas or lenses, and it incorrectly assumes that other systems don't benefit from a criss-crossed nervous systems, so we can reasonably weight the GP's explanation as highly implausible.
- naikrovek 4y ago
  > we can [weigh] the different possible explanations by plausibility that's not science. we have no idea what is plausible or not, really, and we should not forget that. we can make up reasons that seem reasonable or which makes sense when combined with other unproven hypotheses but we simply do not know and we should not be offering up any words other than "we don't know" when asked for explanations.
  - kerkeslager 4y ago
    > we have no idea what is plausible or not, really, and we should not forget that. we can make up reasons that seem reasonable or which makes sense when combined with other unproven hypotheses but we simply do not know and we should not be offering up any words other than "we don't know" when asked for explanations. You're saying "we have no idea what is plausible or not" and then go on to describe what plausibility is. The one part of your definition of plausibility that you're leaving out is observation, which is critical. We aren't just comparing hypotheses to other unproven hypotheses, we're comparing hypotheses to what we observe. We observe that criss-crossed nervous systems predate eyes in the phylogenic record, so from that observation, we can fairly conclusively say that criss-crossed nervous systems did not evolve as a result of eyesight. You can say that this is implausible, unreasonable, or doesn't make sense--I don't particularly care which terminology you prefer, but they're all saying basically the same thing: we know (i.e. have high degree of confidence) that a criss-crossed nervous system did not result from eyesight. I'm not sympathetic to Platonic idealist arguments that "it's not possible to know anything" because that's a completely useless way of thinking, which even the people saying it don't believe. If I offer a philosopher the opportunity to get punched in the face, they'll decline my offer, because they know from prior experience that getting punched in the face will be an unpleasant experience. You can't reasonably claim that it's impossible to know anything in conversation when all the choices in your life are based around the things that you know. Platonic idealist epistemology is a convenience argument that people only trot out when they want to disagree with something. Additionally, the idea is self defeating: if it's impossible to know things, then how do you know it's impossible to know things?
    - naikrovek 4y ago
      hypothesize all you want, imagine the causes all you like, I don't care, but don't say you know, when you don't, that's all. if you don't know, and you're talking to a layman audience, don't say you know. don't pretend you know, don't even present guesses, even when they are framed as guesses, because people will hear you saying you know. "we think [educated guess] but we don't know" is the only acceptable phrasing, to me. Remember this: science can never tell you when your hypothesis is correct. science can only ever tell you when your hypothesis is wrong. I think the entire world has forgotten this. Richard Feynman explains it very well in this lecture, particularly in the bit starting at 20:04. https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/fml.html https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/fml.html
      - kerkeslager 4y ago
        > if you don't know, and you're talking to a layman audience, don't say you know. don't pretend you know, don't even present guesses, even when they are framed as guesses, because people will hear you saying you know. > "we think [educated guess] but we don't know" is the only acceptable phrasing, to me. I understand that it's irresponsible to communicate a greater degree of confidence than is supported by the evidence, but I'm saying that it can also be irresponsible to communicate a lesser degree of confidence than is supported by the evidence. Consider, for example, the statement "vaccines don't cause autism". There is absolutely no evidence that vaccines cause autism (and if you want to argue that, go elsewhere--I'm not going to argue with assholes). Saying "we think vaccines don't cause autism, but we don't know" is irresponsible, because you have people saying, "Vaccines cause autism! I'm 100% sure!" A layman audience, hearing both people, hears that one isn't sure, and the other one is absolutely sure, and so they believe the absolutely sure one. The result is unvaccinated kids, the revitalization of nearly-extinct diseases, and widespread human death and suffering. Pedantically using words that, by their dictionary definition, mean a certain thing, doesn't result in quality communication. If you say words that pedantically mean the truth, but fail to produce the true belief in the minds of your audience, you've failed to communicate. That's not entirely your fault--some of the responsibility for communication rests on the listener--but if you can improve your chances of communicating the truth by speaking with confidence that is supported by the evidence, it is your right and perhaps even obligation to do so. > Remember this: science can never tell you when your hypothesis is correct. science can only ever tell you when your hypothesis is wrong. This is trivially wrong: Let's say your hypothesis is "vaccines cause autism". According to what you just said, we can't prove that hypothesis correct, we can only prove it wrong. So let's say we've proven wrong the hypothesis, "vaccines cause autism". Now consider the hypothesis "vaccines don't cause autism". Haven't you just proven that hypothesis correct? > I think the entire world has forgotten this. Don't you mean "I think the entire world has forgotten this, but I don't know"? /s Cut the melodrama. You're not so special that you have some unique or even rare knowledge that everyone else has forgotten. Lots of people know a hell of a lot more about science than either you or I do. The Feynman video you linked doesn't load the video for me.

kerkeslager 4y ago

I agree that we don't know, but we can weight the different possible explanations by plausibility. The article's explanation would explain all the facts we do know, so we can reasonably weight that as a very plausible explanation. I'll also add that the article says, 'Now, this all makes sense mathematically, but it’s important to note that we don’t know for certain that this is truly why our brains and bodies are connected the way they are. There is very little biological research on this intriguing question. The convenient dodge often heard is that the scientific method tells us “what,” not “why.”' The GP's explanation doesn't explain why worms have criss-crossed nervous systems despite not having retinas or lenses, and it incorrectly assumes that other systems don't benefit from a criss-crossed nervous systems, so we can reasonably weight the GP's explanation as highly implausible.

naikrovek 4y ago
> we can [weigh] the different possible explanations by plausibility that's not science. we have no idea what is plausible or not, really, and we should not forget that. we can make up reasons that seem reasonable or which makes sense when combined with other unproven hypotheses but we simply do not know and we should not be offering up any words other than "we don't know" when asked for explanations.
- kerkeslager 4y ago
  > we have no idea what is plausible or not, really, and we should not forget that. we can make up reasons that seem reasonable or which makes sense when combined with other unproven hypotheses but we simply do not know and we should not be offering up any words other than "we don't know" when asked for explanations. You're saying "we have no idea what is plausible or not" and then go on to describe what plausibility is. The one part of your definition of plausibility that you're leaving out is observation, which is critical. We aren't just comparing hypotheses to other unproven hypotheses, we're comparing hypotheses to what we observe. We observe that criss-crossed nervous systems predate eyes in the phylogenic record, so from that observation, we can fairly conclusively say that criss-crossed nervous systems did not evolve as a result of eyesight. You can say that this is implausible, unreasonable, or doesn't make sense--I don't particularly care which terminology you prefer, but they're all saying basically the same thing: we know (i.e. have high degree of confidence) that a criss-crossed nervous system did not result from eyesight. I'm not sympathetic to Platonic idealist arguments that "it's not possible to know anything" because that's a completely useless way of thinking, which even the people saying it don't believe. If I offer a philosopher the opportunity to get punched in the face, they'll decline my offer, because they know from prior experience that getting punched in the face will be an unpleasant experience. You can't reasonably claim that it's impossible to know anything in conversation when all the choices in your life are based around the things that you know. Platonic idealist epistemology is a convenience argument that people only trot out when they want to disagree with something. Additionally, the idea is self defeating: if it's impossible to know things, then how do you know it's impossible to know things?
  - naikrovek 4y ago
    hypothesize all you want, imagine the causes all you like, I don't care, but don't say you know, when you don't, that's all. if you don't know, and you're talking to a layman audience, don't say you know. don't pretend you know, don't even present guesses, even when they are framed as guesses, because people will hear you saying you know. "we think [educated guess] but we don't know" is the only acceptable phrasing, to me. Remember this: science can never tell you when your hypothesis is correct. science can only ever tell you when your hypothesis is wrong. I think the entire world has forgotten this. Richard Feynman explains it very well in this lecture, particularly in the bit starting at 20:04. https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/fml.html https://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/fml.html
    - kerkeslager 4y ago
      > if you don't know, and you're talking to a layman audience, don't say you know. don't pretend you know, don't even present guesses, even when they are framed as guesses, because people will hear you saying you know. > "we think [educated guess] but we don't know" is the only acceptable phrasing, to me. I understand that it's irresponsible to communicate a greater degree of confidence than is supported by the evidence, but I'm saying that it can also be irresponsible to communicate a lesser degree of confidence than is supported by the evidence. Consider, for example, the statement "vaccines don't cause autism". There is absolutely no evidence that vaccines cause autism (and if you want to argue that, go elsewhere--I'm not going to argue with assholes). Saying "we think vaccines don't cause autism, but we don't know" is irresponsible, because you have people saying, "Vaccines cause autism! I'm 100% sure!" A layman audience, hearing both people, hears that one isn't sure, and the other one is absolutely sure, and so they believe the absolutely sure one. The result is unvaccinated kids, the revitalization of nearly-extinct diseases, and widespread human death and suffering. Pedantically using words that, by their dictionary definition, mean a certain thing, doesn't result in quality communication. If you say words that pedantically mean the truth, but fail to produce the true belief in the minds of your audience, you've failed to communicate. That's not entirely your fault--some of the responsibility for communication rests on the listener--but if you can improve your chances of communicating the truth by speaking with confidence that is supported by the evidence, it is your right and perhaps even obligation to do so. > Remember this: science can never tell you when your hypothesis is correct. science can only ever tell you when your hypothesis is wrong. This is trivially wrong: Let's say your hypothesis is "vaccines cause autism". According to what you just said, we can't prove that hypothesis correct, we can only prove it wrong. So let's say we've proven wrong the hypothesis, "vaccines cause autism". Now consider the hypothesis "vaccines don't cause autism". Haven't you just proven that hypothesis correct? > I think the entire world has forgotten this. Don't you mean "I think the entire world has forgotten this, but I don't know"? /s Cut the melodrama. You're not so special that you have some unique or even rare knowledge that everyone else has forgotten. Lots of people know a hell of a lot more about science than either you or I do. The Feynman video you linked doesn't load the video for me.