The fix for this doesn't need any cryptography. Nothing more than the key receiver and the main ECU agreeing on a randomized number in the "unlock" code. Allo

The fix for this doesn't need any cryptography. Nothing more than the key receiver and the main ECU agreeing on a randomized number in the "unlock" code. Allow unrandomized unlock once, agree on and store random number on both sides, from here on insist on this number. Sure this is insecure in the sense that a device listening to the bus can capture the fixed unlock code for that car, but who cares, it completely disables this attack (generic device can unlock ANY car of that model/series with no prior knowledge). Of course some sort of override is needed to reset the pairing in case one or the other side is replaced in a repair. But this can be made cumbersome enough for a thief not to bother. I'm sure this is well in scope for a field firmware upgrade, so hopefully this attack vector doesn't last long.