4 ms·
The simpler solution would be signed messages over CAN. Any message sent to a security critical part of the car (eg. the door locks) would be signed by the ECU
by londons_explore 4y ago
The simpler solution would be signed messages over CAN.
Any message sent to a security critical part of the car (eg. the door locks) would be signed by the ECU. The signature would use the current date/time as a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The signing certificate would be pre-programmed in at the factory.
Now anyone can say malicious things over the bus, yet still can never unlock the car.
- randunel 4y agoHow would you deal with spare parts, then? If every spare part you swap on your car is able to check and sign messages, then this defeats the purpose. If every spare part needed to be programmed with the private keys, this significantly increases the cost of maintenance and prohibits non-dealers from making such changes. Besides, are the private keys really private when dealers can access them? ECUs are already tightly paired with immobilizers and dashboards, so they already need to be swapped together. Let's not do this with other parts which frequently break such as lights, locks and windows, please.
- sidewndr46 4y agoEasy, only an authorized dealer can make repairs to the vehicle. After a period of time the manufacturer may elect to no longer authorize any repairs, so as to incentivize the purchase of safer and cleaner automobiles.
- tough 4y agoRight to not repair
- boromisp 4y agoYou could allow to pair the part to some central control unit, when the car is unlocked. I don't speak car or cryptographer so so I have no idea about how to go about it, but this seems like a workable solution.
- rhn_mk1 4y agoYou don't need to sign all messages. Only those coming from the critical component, like the key fob, and the only parts that need to check signatures are the critical ones from the perspective of theft. Once you replace the key fob, you must reprogram your engine ignition. What prevents a thief from reprogramming the engine ignition for some other key? The same thing that prevents the thief from starting ignition manually: it's buried in the car. Notice that in this case, thieves rely on CAN buses running in easily accessible places. If the thief can access your car's ignition directly, you can't stop them anyway.
- londons_explore 4y agoNew spare parts can begin unprogrammed, and then program themselves on first use. This first use wouldn't be secure (it would be vulnerable to MITM attacks), but I believe that would be acceptable to the threat model of a thief attacking a parked car. Reprogramming of 2nd hand components to a different vehicle might also be possible, but using some procedure which is hard to do from outside the car. For example, short two pins on the back of the lock.
- TheLoafOfBread 4y agoHow does that part know that it is being unprogrammed in the car and not in the thieves yard with cracked diagnostic tool? So basically I need to pretend to be a new part to steal a car. Some common key as an attack vector.
- vladvasiliu 4y agoPresumably, if you're able to replace the lock on a locked car with your own, you don't need to fool anything, you're already inside the car. I guess the attack vector would rather be some unscrupulous mechanic replacing the part with a bogus one that would accept every unlock command, and the thief, in cahoots with said mechanic, would show up and unlock the car once the owner got it back from the shop.
- TheLoafOfBread 4y agoWell the thing is that this is how cars with encrypted immobilizer gets stolen today (deffo not the case of RAV4) - Open a hood - Connect new, unprogrammed ECU (no immobilizer loaded) - You can now start the car without chip in your key As I see, people are reinventing wheel here, and are creating same problems as OEMs did 10-15 years ago.
- vladvasiliu 4y agoAssuming they're willing to break a window or sacrifice the hood and related bodywork to pop it open without a key, is it really so easy to swap an ECU without having to take half the car apart? My dad used to have a Citroën that would require taking out the whole front bumper assembly to change a freaking light, so it would be beyond stupid to have the ECU easily accessible...
- labcomputer 4y agoThis... seems like a relatively trivial problem to solve? Each device that needs to sign messages (which probably should be only the ECU) is provisioned with a certificate signed by the carmaker. The device is also provisioned with a public-key pair, which is signed by the certificate (so you have chain of trust back to the manufacturer). The public key pair could be either programmed when the firmware is first flashed or generated at first boot. A new door BCM accepts the first broadcasted public key from the ECU which is correctly signed. This would happen inside the factory for a new car, or when a new BCM is installed to replace a faulty one. A used door BCM from a junk yard car could be programmed to accept a different (signed) public key by: 1. Being in the unlocked (and perhaps window-down) state; and 2. Pressing some combination of door buttons; and 3. Sending an appropriate command over the CANbus It, of course, then verifies that the new key is correctly signed and reprograms itself to the new key.
- TheLoafOfBread 4y agoCAN message usually has max 8 bytes, how would you sign it to actually transfer some useful data and without signature being laughably simple to crack?
- londons_explore 4y agoYou can send the command and signature split over multiple messages. It is already common to tunnel other data over CAN with this method.
- TheLoafOfBread 4y agoThat's a nice theory, now let's look into something called CAN bus load - i.e. there is limited amount of CAN messages which you can ram onto a bus. So adding multiple CAN messages to transfer same piece of information will drastically reduce throughput of the system and make it unusable.
- anon4242 4y agoNot a theory. This is used in vehicles today, for instance authentication for tachograph downloading. The key is of course you are not authenticating all the time, in this case it's enough to do when starting the vehicle when the CAN-bus typically is quite quiet.
- TheLoafOfBread 4y agoIf it is only on specific communication channel, then you just need to get a private signing key, i.e. by dumping same type of ECU. And we are back at the beginning.
- anon4242 4y agoI'm not sure whether you are confused or intentionally trying to be confusing but that doesn't make sense in the context of the discussed issue. The signing key would of course be unique per ECU/keyfob that needs to sign stuff so dumping another ECU doesn't help you crack it.
- PinguTS 4y agoFunfact: that’s not a simple solution as it sounds at first. It start to become very complex and expansive when you start looking at it in detail. It starts with costly crypto support at the microcontroller. It goes with complex key agreement protocols. Then everything needs to be unique for each and every car. Because of you don’t do all of this, you can defeat everything very easily.
- anon4242 4y agoIt doesn't have to be that complex. Enough HW crypto support exists in smaller and smaller MCUs. A good enough PSK programmed at the factory would probably be enough and that's the only thing that needs to be unique, everything else can be off-the-shelf vehicle-class components and open source. Btw it's "fun fact" and it typically means there is something factual, not just guesswork.
- xxs 4y agoReading this I thought it was satire... but reading more comments, most of the folks were actually quite real.