3 ms·
Also, if you want to be a troll, add some additional passwords (LUKS2 supports multiple) with weak KDF parameters that are generated like this: head -c48 /
by ryan-c 3y ago
Also, if you want to be a troll, add some additional passwords (LUKS2 supports multiple) with weak KDF parameters that are generated like this:
head -c48 /dev/urandom | base64
It won't add much to your unlock time, but anyone trying to crack your disk will probably try the "easier" ones first.
- mr42023 3y agoIf you've got a TPM to leverage, this is essentially actually what systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2* does. Generate a large, cryptographically-secure key and pair it with PBKDF2 with 1000 iterations. Seal that random value in the TPM with optional PIN. If used, the PIN itself can just be your prior disk encryption passphrase, and now you have the same PW entropy as before with additional protection against PCR modifications and brute-forcing via the TPM
- __MatrixMan__ 3y agoDoesn't that just give the attacker more targets to hit? I know that under normal circumstances you can just write off the wildly improbable case of a hash collision, but when you're up against an army of GPU's I'm not sure I'd want to risk the possibility that `aaa` (or some other brute force candidate) collides with whatever urandom spit out that day.
- rwmj 3y agoThat's quite a funny idea. LUKS2 really should do this by default when creating the empty slots when the disk is initialized first time. The used slots will be overwritten by passphrases, but these other slots would be indistingishable and would waste the attacker's time.