Ah, that's not what I mean by ontologically disconnected. I just mean that since consciousness is not defined, we don't know for sure that it's a purely physica

Ah, that's not what I mean by ontologically disconnected. I just mean that since consciousness is not defined, we don't know for sure that it's a purely physical process. I certainly think so, but the argument I was making can't prove it is or isn't, so it's not an argument that can touch consciousness by itself, because you need an additional assumption to bridge from known physical processes into consciousness that isn't in the argument I presented. In other words even after accepting my argument a skeptic could hold the position that it's ontologically disconnected, so at the level of my argument it remains so. To be even clearer, I just meant that my argument is not sufficient to prove that consciousness can be simulated because I didn't make a good argument for consciousness to be in the category of physical processes in that comment, hence, an ontological disconnection. I personally have the position that they are in the same category, I just meant that my comment above wasn't sufficient to substantiate that claim. Sorry for any misunderstanding.