> Parenthetically I don’t recall whether this was a training issue, a software issue, or a pilot error. Accordingly, I don’t want to sound like I’m slamming the

> Parenthetically I don’t recall whether this was a training issue, a software issue, or a pilot error. Accordingly, I don’t want to sound like I’m slamming the pilot. It was a design issue, which many people like to blame on the pilot because they don't know any better. The problem was that the rate-of-change of control-force per rudder angle is/was negative for that particular Airbus model... which is generally known to lead to PIO (pilot induced oscillations). When I say generally known, I mean it has been documented since at least as early as pre-WWII NACA (the precursor to NASA) studies. In fact, that's what led to the installation of MCAS on 737 Max's: The FAA requires that, for the elevator (but not rudder), the control force should increase as deflection increases. So Boeing tried to simulate that behavior with elevator trim + software. In other words, MCAS was a bad, hacky "solution" to a problem very similar to what happened on AA587 (but for pitch instead of yaw). > On the other hand I’ve seen a B-52 lose just about the entirety of its vertical stabilizer and it didn’t seem to care at all; landed safely. Yea, but a B-52 probably has more elevator authority than most commercial airliners (both because it is meant to go supersonic and need to deal with Mach tuck and because B-52 is expected to shed some "payload" while airborne). The problem is that the vertical stabilizer weighs a ton and is waaaay out at the end of the fuselage, so it really throws off your weight and balance if it falls off.