5 ms·

Gee, maybe they could call the new system "Classification" or something.

Alifatisk 4y ago
I think you are to something here
ceejayoz 4y ago
Part of the problem is the "War on Terror" led to dramatically expanded inter-agency intelligence sharing, which dramatically expanded the number of people with access to a lot of that material - often in organizations with different access policies than you'd probably prefer.
- deleted 4y ago
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- giantg2 4y ago
  If you're going to essentially integrate intelligence agencies from a data standpoint, storage and access protocols should probably be standardized (including with expanded SCI classifications/restrictions).
QuarterReptile 4y ago
My guess at your tone is smugness, but please know that these are totally different things. As the article hints, there are significant costs to limiting distribution. They don't do the problem justice in the slightest. When you restrict access to this stuff, you do it by creating a registration list that inevitably takes weeks to get on, because someone at the requesting command has to get three people, one of whom is probably out for a few weeks, to approve the request and then approve it at the controlling command in a similar process. If you're lucky, the systems are all working and that's all the wait there is, but a person can easily spend dozens of hours of work getting to the point where he can wait several weeks for access. Repeat that excessively, and people just stop using the best intel because it's a pain. Repeat that for a few years and no one at the command even remembers where to get good intel, if they even recall its existence. Cross-org collaboration is a fragile beast in the absence of sales, marketing, profits, etc. At its heart, this most recent problem of insider attack is the same problem as Snowden, and most people reject outright the idea that Snowden was wrong. Anyway, I liked being able to read these; it was nice while it lasted.
- Loquebantur 4y ago
  As you notice yourself, there are serious costs associated with limiting intel. But the downsides of overclassification are much more encompassing than what you described. People "in command" regularly fall prey to the fallacious idea of knowing better than anybody else. In particular, they believe to know who should know what. Regarding Snowden to be wrong in revealing the US surveillance is an example of this fallacy. In essence, you discount human rights to knowledge about reality in favor of petty, self-serving and short-sighted convenience.
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dogma1138 4y ago
Classification is not the same as compartmentalization.
- cheaprentalyeti 4y ago
  No, but it's a way to implement compartmentalization.

I think you are to something here

Part of the problem is the "War on Terror" led to dramatically expanded inter-agency intelligence sharing, which dramatically expanded the number of people with access to a lot of that material - often in organizations with different access policies than you'd probably prefer.

deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
giantg2 4y ago
If you're going to essentially integrate intelligence agencies from a data standpoint, storage and access protocols should probably be standardized (including with expanded SCI classifications/restrictions).

QuarterReptile 4y ago

My guess at your tone is smugness, but please know that these are totally different things. As the article hints, there are significant costs to limiting distribution. They don't do the problem justice in the slightest. When you restrict access to this stuff, you do it by creating a registration list that inevitably takes weeks to get on, because someone at the requesting command has to get three people, one of whom is probably out for a few weeks, to approve the request and then approve it at the controlling command in a similar process. If you're lucky, the systems are all working and that's all the wait there is, but a person can easily spend dozens of hours of work getting to the point where he can wait several weeks for access. Repeat that excessively, and people just stop using the best intel because it's a pain. Repeat that for a few years and no one at the command even remembers where to get good intel, if they even recall its existence. Cross-org collaboration is a fragile beast in the absence of sales, marketing, profits, etc. At its heart, this most recent problem of insider attack is the same problem as Snowden, and most people reject outright the idea that Snowden was wrong. Anyway, I liked being able to read these; it was nice while it lasted.

Loquebantur 4y ago
As you notice yourself, there are serious costs associated with limiting intel. But the downsides of overclassification are much more encompassing than what you described. People "in command" regularly fall prey to the fallacious idea of knowing better than anybody else. In particular, they believe to know who should know what. Regarding Snowden to be wrong in revealing the US surveillance is an example of this fallacy. In essence, you discount human rights to knowledge about reality in favor of petty, self-serving and short-sighted convenience.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]

dogma1138 4y ago

Classification is not the same as compartmentalization.

cheaprentalyeti 4y ago
No, but it's a way to implement compartmentalization.