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Pentagon leak leads to limits on who gets access to military’s top secrets
- darthrupert 4y agoGiven how incredibly stupid the leaker seemed to be (chatting in fucking Discord server with Russians about very secret material), I have to wonder: did they really have no limits before? Or is this leak another operation?
- bell-cot 4y agoNot "no limits"...but "reasonable", "prudent", and "need to know" seem to be missing from their de facto rules & reg's. Years ago, I heard a detailed and all-too-credible account of some serious US secrets being regularly leaked - to an Average Guy, whose (reasonable and innocent) domain name was the ".com" version of an important ".mil" domain. Supposedly, he tried to report the problem to the US govt - and got some pretty nasty push-back, from officers whose only priorities seemed to be denial and butt-coverage. After that, he just deleted the ongoing emails.
- 0zemp1c 4y ago[flagged]
- cheaprentalyeti 4y agoGee, maybe they could call the new system "Classification" or something.
- Alifatisk 4y agoI think you are to something here
- ceejayoz 4y agoPart of the problem is the "War on Terror" led to dramatically expanded inter-agency intelligence sharing, which dramatically expanded the number of people with access to a lot of that material - often in organizations with different access policies than you'd probably prefer.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- giantg2 4y agoIf you're going to essentially integrate intelligence agencies from a data standpoint, storage and access protocols should probably be standardized (including with expanded SCI classifications/restrictions).
- QuarterReptile 4y agoMy guess at your tone is smugness, but please know that these are totally different things. As the article hints, there are significant costs to limiting distribution. They don't do the problem justice in the slightest. When you restrict access to this stuff, you do it by creating a registration list that inevitably takes weeks to get on, because someone at the requesting command has to get three people, one of whom is probably out for a few weeks, to approve the request and then approve it at the controlling command in a similar process. If you're lucky, the systems are all working and that's all the wait there is, but a person can easily spend dozens of hours of work getting to the point where he can wait several weeks for access. Repeat that excessively, and people just stop using the best intel because it's a pain. Repeat that for a few years and no one at the command even remembers where to get good intel, if they even recall its existence. Cross-org collaboration is a fragile beast in the absence of sales, marketing, profits, etc. At its heart, this most recent problem of insider attack is the same problem as Snowden, and most people reject outright the idea that Snowden was wrong. Anyway, I liked being able to read these; it was nice while it lasted.
- Loquebantur 4y agoAs you notice yourself, there are serious costs associated with limiting intel. But the downsides of overclassification are much more encompassing than what you described. People "in command" regularly fall prey to the fallacious idea of knowing better than anybody else. In particular, they believe to know who should know what. Regarding Snowden to be wrong in revealing the US surveillance is an example of this fallacy. In essence, you discount human rights to knowledge about reality in favor of petty, self-serving and short-sighted convenience.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- dogma1138 4y agoClassification is not the same as compartmentalization.
- cheaprentalyeti 4y agoNo, but it's a way to implement compartmentalization.
- jp42 4y agoLeaks can be intentional to misguide enemies. Wondering how to identify this one is legit or intentional leak?
- kevin_thibedeau 4y agoI'm definitely suspicious that the "ammunition shortage" is misinformation. They're too willing to discuss that with the media.
- rjsw 4y agoWhy? There was a RUSI article last year that looked at it. The one area that was in good shape was 5.56 production, the US "assault rifle" gun culture takes care of that. [1] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentar...
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- mauvehaus 4y agoCouple of points: 5.56x45 is a NATO caliber. Historically, the AK-47 used 7.62x39, and the more modern AK variants use 5.45x39. I'm sure the Ukrainians are happily taking anything that they can get at the moment, but I'd be surprised if their small arms at the start of the war were chambered for 5.56. Second, I doubt that the private gun owners of the United States consume as much 5.56/.223 as the entirety of NATO. The cartridge is widely available, popular, and comparatively inexpensive because of the large military demand for it. I'd be further very surprised if the combined US private consumption of all other centerfire[0] rifle cartridges adds up to the private US consumption of 5.56. The economies of scale behind 5.56 are huge. 5.56 can be had for under $1/round in bulk. Most other centerfire rifle cartridges aren't commonly sold in bulk (.308/7.62x51 being the only other one that comes to mind, which is also a NATO round). Basically anything that you might reasonably hunt deer[0] with is around $2/round. The takeaway from all this should be that if NATO went to war, we might have to worry about the supply of 5.56. While there's a very visible part of the US gun culture that's dominated by the popularity of 5.56 and AR-pattern weapons, I don't think we can "thank" it for the abundance of 5.56 relative to the shortage of everything else that's being used in Ukraine. [0] The .22 S/L/LR variants and the .17 derivatives are rimfire, which are entirely different from a manufacturing standpoint. [1] I'm not going to get into the debate of whether 5.56 is suitable as a deer cartridge. I don't know. 5.56 is in broadly the same class of cartridges as the classic deer cartridges, at least from a manufacturing standpoint.
- mkl95 4y ago> many Pentagon officials are also given binders of printed intelligence daily, said two senior US officials If they are leaking information every day, they have bigger things to worry about than some guy leaking some documents on Discord. They should be worried about the leaks they don't know about, since the perpetrators could get away with it indefinitely.
- bbq 4y agoYup, IMHO what was leaked in this case is not so important. What is important is how it was leaked, how long it was leaked for, and how long it took to notice. edit: OK, I was wrong here with my priorities.
- ROTMetro 4y agoHow many people would need to be killed for you to consider the leak important? How many friendly countries involved in an ongoing war with your number one adversarial nation for the last 80s have to have their spring offensive plans impacted in the middle of a war would make this 'important' to your mind?
- tpmx 4y agoYikes. Please do tell how you came to that conclusion.
- bbq 4y agoYes, you're right. I failed to keep a full perspective when I wrote that. I won't defend that. I do feel it's significant that it took about a month from the sharing on that minecraft server for these leaks to be recognized. I'm surprised no one on the server flagged it, or it wasn't picked up by some intelligence program. That's where my shock came from. It feels like a deeper problem. Maybe I'm naive in believing the military/intelligence community didn't know before this news broke.
- m0llusk 4y agoBinders full of intelligence, a flashback to the 2012 Presidential campaign.
- just_steve_h 4y agoAnyone close to the US security establishment recognizes the widespread abuse of the classification system. It becomes the default stance, to slap a “SECRET” designation on something. Just like how, in the old days, “nobody ever got fired for buying IBM,” today we nights say “nobody ever got reprimanded for classifying documents.” When the classification system balloons like this, inevitably the number of people with access rises as well. And, the seriousness with which they regard classification plummets.
- kevin_thibedeau 4y agoAfter 9/11 there was a notice that went out to not use the most restrictive portion markings, unless truly necessary, in the interest of promoting information sharing between silos. In particular the NOFORN being applied excessively, limiting sharing with foreign allies.
- warner25 4y agoThere are still periodic reminders about this but, to the parent's point, it's still the case that nobody gets fired for erring on the side of prudence. You might get a few stern words from someone senior to you, but won't get wrapped up in a criminal investigation. What I've seen in busy headquarters, dealing with a mix of classified and unclassified material, is also something like decision fatigue. Like there are multiple required drop-down menu selections and free text fields for classification and caveats every time someone sends an email in Outlook, and most people are kind of guessing about what's really SECRET vs. CUI vs. whatever else, never mind caveats for specific allies and partners. So what prevails are simple rules-of-thumbs like "just send all email on SIPRNet, marked SECRET, but not NOFORN because that will piss off the Australian deputy commander" until someone more senior says otherwise.
- TurkishPoptart 4y ago>“Colonels and generals have their staff killing trees because they like paper, want to hold it closer with their reading glasses on, want to take it to in-person meetings or to read in between meetings,” said a former US official familiar with the Pentagon’s classified system. Pentagon official sounds more concerned with "killing trees" than the concerns of American taxpayers over waste, abuse, and fraud.
- breakingrules 4y ago[dead]
- elif 4y agoIt's remarkable that so many news outlets are permitted to discuss the content of these obviously actively strategically important leaks while assange rots in solitary for revealing war crimes.
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> remarkable that so many news outlets are permitted to discuss the content of these obviously actively strategically important leaks while assange rots in solitary for revealing war crimes Discussing leaked material isn’t a crime. Leaking material is.
- iso1631 4y agoDid Assange leak material? Manning did, and she was in jail because of it. (edit - was)
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- tzs 4y agoManning was released from jail in early 2017 after her sentence was commuted by President Obama.
- dwheeler 4y agoMy understanding is that there are big differences. Manning was an Army Private First Class, that is, enlisted military, who had specifically signed agreements to not disclose classified information. It's not exactly the same thing, but similar things happen in private industry. If an employee of a company posted a trade secret the employee had agreed to keep secret, that's legally actionable, while others sharing it without any agreement with the company generally can't be sued. That said, IANAL. If you need legal advise, I'm not it :-).
- iso1631 4y agoAssange presumably hadn't signed anything like that, nor is he a US citizen. He did however skip bail, and rightly paid for that. I was disappointed by the high court's view to allow extradition, especially given the one-sided approach to extradition that US takes with its citizens, but it was hardly surprising given how far up the US's ass the UK is. Of course a decade ago it was all "I don't want to go to Sweden because I'll be extradited", despite that easily being the case from the UK.
- amriksohata 4y agoThey already have this, this makes me wonder was the leak intentional to send the opposition off course?
- andy_ppp 4y agoI’m surprised documents like these aren’t all watermarked and analysis possible on who downloaded them?
- el_benhameen 4y agoI would think that they are. That’s how they got Reality Winner. I wouldn’t be surprised if watermarking is part of the story when they end up catching the guy.
- okdood64 4y agoAlmost certainly. Though are ways to account for that fact after they are printed: https://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/how-intercept-outed-reality-winner.html https://blog.erratasec.com/2017/06/how-intercept-outed-reali...