I argue against the notion that a large language model has an "internal understanding". It has parameter weights. For some philosophy on the matter, here is so

I argue against the notion that a large language model has an "internal understanding". It has parameter weights. For some philosophy on the matter, here is some Wittgenstein as quoted in https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 >“Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all – For that is the expression which confuses you… In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not itself a mental process… Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how to go on, when he Understood the principle [of, e.g., the number series to be completed], Then possibly he had a special experience – and if he is asked: ‘What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the principle?’ perhaps he will describe it… – but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him is saying in such a case that he understands." (Wittgenstein, 1968, paragraphs 154–155)