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>They will find tokens for 'dig' and 'it', as well as 'add', 'car' and 'ry'. Neurons are not tokens. Technical jargon isn't fungible. >They will not find inte

>They will find tokens for 'dig' and 'it', as well as 'add', 'car' and 'ry'. Neurons are not tokens. Technical jargon isn't fungible. >They will not find internalized understanding of the concept of math. I'm not sure how you figure that. The AlphaGo Zero model is able to learn and reach massively superhuman ability on any board game thrown at, including new ones not in its training set. I don't see how someone or something goes about mopping the floor with grandmasters (and the top champions of every other game) without having some kind of internal understanding of what it is you're playing. If there isn't an internal understanding then what is it doing? Sure we can say it is just predicting tokens, but obviously it using more than just random chance to predict them or else the output would be gibberish. What is inside those dozens of neural layers may not be a familiar form like logic gates assembled into add and carry circuits, but clearly some type of decision structure exists.

ttpphd 4y ago
I argue against the notion that a large language model has an "internal understanding". It has parameter weights. For some philosophy on the matter, here is some Wittgenstein as quoted in https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 >“Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all – For that is the expression which confuses you… In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not itself a mental process… Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how to go on, when he Understood the principle [of, e.g., the number series to be completed], Then possibly he had a special experience – and if he is asked: ‘What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the principle?’ perhaps he will describe it… – but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him is saying in such a case that he understands." (Wittgenstein, 1968, paragraphs 154–155)

ttpphd 4y ago

I argue against the notion that a large language model has an "internal understanding". It has parameter weights. For some philosophy on the matter, here is some Wittgenstein as quoted in https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2011.04.028 >“Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all – For that is the expression which confuses you… In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not itself a mental process… Thus what I wanted to say was: when he suddenly knew how to go on, when he Understood the principle [of, e.g., the number series to be completed], Then possibly he had a special experience – and if he is asked: ‘What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the principle?’ perhaps he will describe it… – but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him is saying in such a case that he understands." (Wittgenstein, 1968, paragraphs 154–155)