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> There really isn't one and 99% of the field agrees that brains are just computers. Again, this is blatantly false. There is no such consensus on the computab

> There really isn't one and 99% of the field agrees that brains are just computers. Again, this is blatantly false. There is no such consensus on the computability of consciousness. Where do you get that 99% from? > That there is something supernatural that even infinite regular computation could never capture. You are asserting the universe is equivalent to a Turing machine (digital physics hypothesis). There is no consensus on that. It's an open research topic.

sudosysgen 3y ago
The idea that the universe can be simulated on a Turing machine to a sufficient accuracy is not the same as the digital physics hypothesis, and it's currently the vastly dominant position amongst physicists. If our current understanding of physics is accurate, then yes the universe can be sampled by a probabilistic Turing machine to any required precision. For this to be false would require a new and fundamental discovery in physics. Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument.
- Mike_12345 3y ago
  So you're saying that consciousness has nothing to do with physics?
  - sudosysgen 3y ago
    I'm not, I'm simply not taking a position on the matter for the purpose of the comment above.
    - Mike_12345 3y ago
      "Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument." How is that ontologically disconnected? You forgot to provide an explanation. You wrote something interesting and I would like to know why you think that. My understanding is that consciousness and physics being ontologically disconnected means that there is no direct causal relationship between the two.
      - sudosysgen 3y ago
        Ah, that's not what I mean by ontologically disconnected. I just mean that since consciousness is not defined, we don't know for sure that it's a purely physical process. I certainly think so, but the argument I was making can't prove it is or isn't, so it's not an argument that can touch consciousness by itself, because you need an additional assumption to bridge from known physical processes into consciousness that isn't in the argument I presented. In other words even after accepting my argument a skeptic could hold the position that it's ontologically disconnected, so at the level of my argument it remains so. To be even clearer, I just meant that my argument is not sufficient to prove that consciousness can be simulated because I didn't make a good argument for consciousness to be in the category of physical processes in that comment, hence, an ontological disconnection. I personally have the position that they are in the same category, I just meant that my comment above wasn't sufficient to substantiate that claim. Sorry for any misunderstanding.

sudosysgen 3y ago

The idea that the universe can be simulated on a Turing machine to a sufficient accuracy is not the same as the digital physics hypothesis, and it's currently the vastly dominant position amongst physicists. If our current understanding of physics is accurate, then yes the universe can be sampled by a probabilistic Turing machine to any required precision. For this to be false would require a new and fundamental discovery in physics. Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument.

Mike_12345 3y ago
So you're saying that consciousness has nothing to do with physics?
- sudosysgen 3y ago
  I'm not, I'm simply not taking a position on the matter for the purpose of the comment above.
  - Mike_12345 3y ago
    "Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument." How is that ontologically disconnected? You forgot to provide an explanation. You wrote something interesting and I would like to know why you think that. My understanding is that consciousness and physics being ontologically disconnected means that there is no direct causal relationship between the two.
    - sudosysgen 3y ago
      Ah, that's not what I mean by ontologically disconnected. I just mean that since consciousness is not defined, we don't know for sure that it's a purely physical process. I certainly think so, but the argument I was making can't prove it is or isn't, so it's not an argument that can touch consciousness by itself, because you need an additional assumption to bridge from known physical processes into consciousness that isn't in the argument I presented. In other words even after accepting my argument a skeptic could hold the position that it's ontologically disconnected, so at the level of my argument it remains so. To be even clearer, I just meant that my argument is not sufficient to prove that consciousness can be simulated because I didn't make a good argument for consciousness to be in the category of physical processes in that comment, hence, an ontological disconnection. I personally have the position that they are in the same category, I just meant that my comment above wasn't sufficient to substantiate that claim. Sorry for any misunderstanding.