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You seem to be tripping up on an imaginary difference between computers and brains. There really isn't one and 99% of the field agrees that brains are just comp
by Workaccount2 4y ago
You seem to be tripping up on an imaginary difference between computers and brains. There really isn't one and 99% of the field agrees that brains are just computers.
The only out you would have is to claim that there is something supernatural that separates the fundamental operations of a brain from those of computation, i.e. given an computer the size of the universe, with billions of CPUS and GPUS to simulate each neuron of a brain, that you still would not be able to simulate one. That there is something supernatural that even infinite regular computation could never capture.
If you don't take that stance, then the only line you are drawing between brains and computers is their compute performance for a given task (even if that task is "be conscious").
This is (perhaps) similar to the difference between regular and quantum computers. There is nothing a quantum computer can do that a regular computer can't, the difference is just in their relative performance for given tasks.
- YeGoblynQueenne 4y ago>> You seem to be tripping up on an imaginary difference between computers and brains. No, you're mixing up computers with computational devices. A "computer" is what I have in front of me now, as I write these words. My brain is not a "computer" it's maybe a computational device, maybe something else entirely. We have no idea how brains really work. And there is no consensus like the one you try to claim in any field. I mean "99% of the field?". That sounds more like an advert for toothpaste. "99% of dentists recommend Whitex!!". >> The only out you would have >> If you don't take that stance Get off your high horse and stop god-moding the conversation. You are trying very hard to invent a hill for me to die on based on something you'd really have liked me to say, just so you could pretend to win the conversation. The only person who has said anything about anything supernatural in this conversation is you. If you can't imagine why else I might disagree with you, that's your lack of perspective and nothing to do with me, or what I think.
- Mike_12345 4y ago> There really isn't one and 99% of the field agrees that brains are just computers. Again, this is blatantly false. There is no such consensus on the computability of consciousness. Where do you get that 99% from? > That there is something supernatural that even infinite regular computation could never capture. You are asserting the universe is equivalent to a Turing machine (digital physics hypothesis). There is no consensus on that. It's an open research topic.
- sudosysgen 4y agoThe idea that the universe can be simulated on a Turing machine to a sufficient accuracy is not the same as the digital physics hypothesis, and it's currently the vastly dominant position amongst physicists. If our current understanding of physics is accurate, then yes the universe can be sampled by a probabilistic Turing machine to any required precision. For this to be false would require a new and fundamental discovery in physics. Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument.
- Mike_12345 4y agoSo you're saying that consciousness has nothing to do with physics?
- sudosysgen 4y agoI'm not, I'm simply not taking a position on the matter for the purpose of the comment above.
- Mike_12345 4y ago"Wether or not that means consciousness is computable is an ontologically disconnected argument." How is that ontologically disconnected? You forgot to provide an explanation. You wrote something interesting and I would like to know why you think that. My understanding is that consciousness and physics being ontologically disconnected means that there is no direct causal relationship between the two.
- sudosysgen 4y agoAh, that's not what I mean by ontologically disconnected. I just mean that since consciousness is not defined, we don't know for sure that it's a purely physical process. I certainly think so, but the argument I was making can't prove it is or isn't, so it's not an argument that can touch consciousness by itself, because you need an additional assumption to bridge from known physical processes into consciousness that isn't in the argument I presented. In other words even after accepting my argument a skeptic could hold the position that it's ontologically disconnected, so at the level of my argument it remains so. To be even clearer, I just meant that my argument is not sufficient to prove that consciousness can be simulated because I didn't make a good argument for consciousness to be in the category of physical processes in that comment, hence, an ontological disconnection. I personally have the position that they are in the same category, I just meant that my comment above wasn't sufficient to substantiate that claim. Sorry for any misunderstanding.