6 ms·

This is hardly an indefensible position. John Searle, for one, has argued this point for more than 40 years: "Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chi

This is hardly an indefensible position. John Searle, for one, has argued this point for more than 40 years: "Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following the instructions in the program the man in the room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output). The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese." Later he wrote: "I demonstrated years ago with the so-called Chinese Room Argument that the implementation of the computer program is not by itself sufficient for consciousness or intentionality (Searle 1980). Computation is defined purely formally or syntactically, whereas minds have actual mental or semantic contents, and we cannot get from syntactical to the semantic just by having the syntactical operations and nothing else. To put this point slightly more technically, the notion “same implemented program” defines an equivalence class that is specified independently of any specific physical realization. But such a specification necessarily leaves out the biologically specific powers of the brain to cause cognitive processes. A system, me, for example, would not acquire an understanding of Chinese just by going through the steps of a computer program that simulated the behavior of a Chinese speaker."

Loquebantur 4y ago
That argument is laughably faulty. It hides the conscious understanding, presumably necessary to pass a Turing test, within the "program". The human in the story is merely a decoy performing robotic tasks.
p_j_w 4y ago
It doesn't sound to me like he's making the argument that you think he is. He's saying that being able to manipulate Chinese symbols per some instructions isn't sufficient to demonstrate understanding of Chinese. Okay, I agree. But seeing someone manipulate Chinese symbols doesn't mean that you can assume they're simply following instructions without understanding the symbols either, does it?
dale_glass 4y ago
I propose an alternate thought experiment. Let's suppose we build the Cosine room. The room is full of 10 year olds that haven't yet taken trig. Each performs the function of a transistor, and has no idea of what they're doing, other than blindly executing the instructions they were given. None of the participants has the slightest clue about what a cosine is. Yet, the output of the room will still be cos(x). Thus I think it's fair to say that the room as a whole implements cos(x). In the same way, I don't see why wouldn't we conclude the room is speaking Chinese. It doesn't matter how it manages to do so and what it's made of. If it quacks like a Chinese duck, then it's a Chinese duck.
- bigtex88 4y ago
  You're 100% right about this. The Chinese Room argument has been largely debunked, and you just proved one reason why.
- babyshake 4y ago
  Along these lines, it seems the growing consensus is less that AI is more conscious than previously thought, and more than human minds are less conscious than previously thought.
- roddylindsay 4y ago
  I think Searle would agree with you that the room does in fact speak Chinese. His point is that the neither the person, the machine, or "the room" understands Chinese, at least in the usual sense of that word when it comes to understanding as implemented by humans.
  - famouswaffles 4y ago
    it's still a stupid argument because the brain itself is a chinese room. forget cells or atoms, none of your neurons or synapses understand chinese.
    - nanny 4y ago
      >forget cells or atoms, none of your neurons or synapses understand chinese. And yet some people seem to understand Chinese just fine. How can you explain that gap? It's only a stupid argument if you first assume that functionalism is true.
hombre_fatal 4y ago
How does the Chinese room thought experiment not also apply to individual neurons in the brain that don't understand what they are doing? The second quote doesn't illuminate that. Which biological processes break the symmetry?
mcguire 4y ago
As an alternative to Loquebantur's comment, Searle's is trivially reversed: he has no way to demonstrate that he has "semantic" capabilities. On the first hand, all communication is purely syntactic; letters, words, gestures, and every other formulation of communication is the transfer of symbols, which cannot carry semantic information. They can point to it, they can imply it, but you'll have to dance pretty hard to actually prove the transfer of semantic information. If you and I both have some semantic concept associated with the symbol "China" in our mental landscapes, neither I nor you, nor anyone, has any way determining whether that is the same semantic concept. In fact, it almost assuredly isn't, since those semantic concepts would have to be built from our unique personal histories, which are unique. On the second, the fundamental assumption of semantic communication is that I feel like I have semantic shenanigans going on in my mental life and Searle sort of looks like me, so I should assume that he has semantic stuff going on. Not only is that not a particularly well-founded assumption, I can't even be sure I have semantic contents in my mental life. Introspection isn't exactly reliable, right? On the third hand, you have a choice: if you do not agree with Penrose, et al, on the quantum nature of the magic of mind, then Searle's "biologically specific powers" are chemistry. Now, I never actually took a chemistry class, but I don't believe there is any chemical reaction that comes with a label of semantics. It's all physics anyway, which I know cannot introduce semantics. If you do agree with Penrose (which I understand Searle does), the situation is not actually better. Quantum mechanical antics are random, right? Bell's Inequality and all? Being fundamentally, quantum mechanically, random is not in any sense better from a semantic standpoint than being syntactically deterministic. So my bottom line is that I don't know if I have semantic contents, I absolutely don't know if Searle has semantic contents (and I'm not feeling generous), and I do not know of any way that he could prove to me that he does have "semantic contents". So, yeah. You notice I only addressed the second paragraph from Searle. That is because the fundamental flaw in his Chinese Room "demonstration" is on obvious display in his final sentence, "The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese"; it is purely, straight up, dualistic. He is asserting that the person in the room has some magic property of "consciousness or intentionality" and that if the person in the room does not have the "semantic capability" of understanding Chinese, then it is impossible despite all evidence that anything in the scenario has the semantic capability of understanding Chinese. You could put a native Chinese speaker in the room, reading and responding to the inputs, and he claims it would have "consciousness or intentionality"; you then replace her with me (who didn't exactly dazzle at Spanish and Latin) and even if I produce the same outputs in response to the inputs as she does, there is no "consciousness or intentionality". The difference is simply a magic, intangible, imperceptible soul. Whoo. Went off on that one.

Loquebantur 4y ago

That argument is laughably faulty. It hides the conscious understanding, presumably necessary to pass a Turing test, within the "program". The human in the story is merely a decoy performing robotic tasks.

p_j_w 4y ago

It doesn't sound to me like he's making the argument that you think he is. He's saying that being able to manipulate Chinese symbols per some instructions isn't sufficient to demonstrate understanding of Chinese. Okay, I agree. But seeing someone manipulate Chinese symbols doesn't mean that you can assume they're simply following instructions without understanding the symbols either, does it?

dale_glass 4y ago

I propose an alternate thought experiment. Let's suppose we build the Cosine room. The room is full of 10 year olds that haven't yet taken trig. Each performs the function of a transistor, and has no idea of what they're doing, other than blindly executing the instructions they were given. None of the participants has the slightest clue about what a cosine is. Yet, the output of the room will still be cos(x). Thus I think it's fair to say that the room as a whole implements cos(x). In the same way, I don't see why wouldn't we conclude the room is speaking Chinese. It doesn't matter how it manages to do so and what it's made of. If it quacks like a Chinese duck, then it's a Chinese duck.

bigtex88 4y ago
You're 100% right about this. The Chinese Room argument has been largely debunked, and you just proved one reason why.
babyshake 4y ago
Along these lines, it seems the growing consensus is less that AI is more conscious than previously thought, and more than human minds are less conscious than previously thought.
roddylindsay 4y ago
I think Searle would agree with you that the room does in fact speak Chinese. His point is that the neither the person, the machine, or "the room" understands Chinese, at least in the usual sense of that word when it comes to understanding as implemented by humans.
- famouswaffles 4y ago
  it's still a stupid argument because the brain itself is a chinese room. forget cells or atoms, none of your neurons or synapses understand chinese.
  - nanny 4y ago
    >forget cells or atoms, none of your neurons or synapses understand chinese. And yet some people seem to understand Chinese just fine. How can you explain that gap? It's only a stupid argument if you first assume that functionalism is true.

hombre_fatal 4y ago

How does the Chinese room thought experiment not also apply to individual neurons in the brain that don't understand what they are doing? The second quote doesn't illuminate that. Which biological processes break the symmetry?

mcguire 4y ago

As an alternative to Loquebantur's comment, Searle's is trivially reversed: he has no way to demonstrate that he has "semantic" capabilities. On the first hand, all communication is purely syntactic; letters, words, gestures, and every other formulation of communication is the transfer of symbols, which cannot carry semantic information. They can point to it, they can imply it, but you'll have to dance pretty hard to actually prove the transfer of semantic information. If you and I both have some semantic concept associated with the symbol "China" in our mental landscapes, neither I nor you, nor anyone, has any way determining whether that is the same semantic concept. In fact, it almost assuredly isn't, since those semantic concepts would have to be built from our unique personal histories, which are unique. On the second, the fundamental assumption of semantic communication is that I feel like I have semantic shenanigans going on in my mental life and Searle sort of looks like me, so I should assume that he has semantic stuff going on. Not only is that not a particularly well-founded assumption, I can't even be sure I have semantic contents in my mental life. Introspection isn't exactly reliable, right? On the third hand, you have a choice: if you do not agree with Penrose, et al, on the quantum nature of the magic of mind, then Searle's "biologically specific powers" are chemistry. Now, I never actually took a chemistry class, but I don't believe there is any chemical reaction that comes with a label of semantics. It's all physics anyway, which I know cannot introduce semantics. If you do agree with Penrose (which I understand Searle does), the situation is not actually better. Quantum mechanical antics are random, right? Bell's Inequality and all? Being fundamentally, quantum mechanically, random is not in any sense better from a semantic standpoint than being syntactically deterministic. So my bottom line is that I don't know if I have semantic contents, I absolutely don't know if Searle has semantic contents (and I'm not feeling generous), and I do not know of any way that he could prove to me that he does have "semantic contents". So, yeah. You notice I only addressed the second paragraph from Searle. That is because the fundamental flaw in his Chinese Room "demonstration" is on obvious display in his final sentence, "The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese"; it is purely, straight up, dualistic. He is asserting that the person in the room has some magic property of "consciousness or intentionality" and that if the person in the room does not have the "semantic capability" of understanding Chinese, then it is impossible despite all evidence that anything in the scenario has the semantic capability of understanding Chinese. You could put a native Chinese speaker in the room, reading and responding to the inputs, and he claims it would have "consciousness or intentionality"; you then replace her with me (who didn't exactly dazzle at Spanish and Latin) and even if I produce the same outputs in response to the inputs as she does, there is no "consciousness or intentionality". The difference is simply a magic, intangible, imperceptible soul. Whoo. Went off on that one.