Projected Marine MLR deployment in Ryukyus and whatever JP is throwing to fortify is nowhere near "mass". It's not close to replacing sortie/fires output of car

Projected Marine MLR deployment in Ryukyus and whatever JP is throwing to fortify is nowhere near "mass". It's not close to replacing sortie/fires output of carrier groups. Ryukyus is TW "alternative" in terms of peacetime PRC containment, i.e. stationing signit, dragging sosus infra, stationing some irbms, but it's just as much a deathtrap as TW proper during hot war. The argument for Ryukyus is that even if TW falls, US has comparable geographic access to 1st island chain containment, not that it's really significant/survivable forward stationing during war. Dissenting analysis (imo the more reasonable assessment) of Ryukyu posture is boils down to, marines need a reason to justify defense pie in IndoPac, but rationale not not great because island groups that close to PRC are unsuppliable death sentence once shooting starts.