3 ms·

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-Roads-to-Controlling-Taiwan.pdf?x91208 https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-.

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-Roads-to-Controlling-Taiwan.pdf?x91208 https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-... But more generally my take is that most people have no idea how these things function at a basic level.

AYBABTME 4y ago
The document you shared, and that which they link to referring to SK, sort of comes to the conclusion that I stated: SK would probably not allow the US to use its bases. It's the least bad position for them. Aside from securing the peninsula, any support to the US would leave SK exposed to China encouraging NK to make trouble. And even if China doesn't, NK would be emboldened by the lack of focus from the US and Japan. If there's a large scale conflict, SK might be able to hold off and defeat NK, but this wouldn't be without massive pain. That might be less likely, but small scale skirmishes already happen and I would expect much larger ones to take place under the umbrella of a wider US/China conflict. And yet, SK also doesn't really have a choice but to follow the US in a wider conflict, because of mutual defense treaties. Breaking from those agreements would ruin the long term prospects of SK, unless China prevails in the long term. It strikes me as really not an easy position for them to be in. The SK population would hate losing capitalist US as an ally and becoming closer to communist China. And yet if the US doesn't look like it'll prevail over China, geopolitics pressure would almost require SK to break from their defense treaties with the US. Yeah, to me this strikes me as an area that is really overlooked. Any conflict between the US and China would involve Tokyo, and Seoul. But Tokyo isn't as exposed to hard power from China as Seoul is. And yet, Seoul is barely mentioned in those articles.

3 ms·

https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-Roads-to-Controlling-Taiwan.pdf?x91208 https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Chinas-Three-.

by fauxpause_ 4y ago

AYBABTME 4y ago
The document you shared, and that which they link to referring to SK, sort of comes to the conclusion that I stated: SK would probably not allow the US to use its bases. It's the least bad position for them. Aside from securing the peninsula, any support to the US would leave SK exposed to China encouraging NK to make trouble. And even if China doesn't, NK would be emboldened by the lack of focus from the US and Japan. If there's a large scale conflict, SK might be able to hold off and defeat NK, but this wouldn't be without massive pain. That might be less likely, but small scale skirmishes already happen and I would expect much larger ones to take place under the umbrella of a wider US/China conflict. And yet, SK also doesn't really have a choice but to follow the US in a wider conflict, because of mutual defense treaties. Breaking from those agreements would ruin the long term prospects of SK, unless China prevails in the long term. It strikes me as really not an easy position for them to be in. The SK population would hate losing capitalist US as an ally and becoming closer to communist China. And yet if the US doesn't look like it'll prevail over China, geopolitics pressure would almost require SK to break from their defense treaties with the US. Yeah, to me this strikes me as an area that is really overlooked. Any conflict between the US and China would involve Tokyo, and Seoul. But Tokyo isn't as exposed to hard power from China as Seoul is. And yet, Seoul is barely mentioned in those articles.