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For those that are uninitiated, Wittgenstein's Ladder is essentially the conclusion of his extreme logical positivist view of language specifically, but reality

by dvt 4y ago

For those that are uninitiated, Wittgenstein's Ladder is essentially the conclusion of his extreme logical positivist view of language specifically, but reality more generally; it's kind of far out, so we don't really have a term for it, but it's probably something like "materialist positivism" or "logical realism†." It's extremely fringe and essentially does away with all metaphysics, which is very problematic because we have a lot of metaphysical problems in philosophy. Even if we ignore the more "pedestrian" moral quandaries, we'll quickly need to deal with things like the metaphysics of causation[1] or modality[2]. Full disclosure, I'm not a fan of Wittgenstein at all (I wish he were less studied in universities), and I think his Tractatus is nonsense (though not because I'm climbing his ladder) and an abject failure. † Which is a real thing, but I'm not sure if it's completely correct to use here. [1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ [2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

galaxyLogic 4y ago
There is a correspondence between words and reality. When you explain something you do it with words and then you must define those words. Once you understand some "model" it does not matter what are the words you gave to the components of the whole and the relations between them. You would create such a model out of colored wires. You could attach a note to each wire giving it a name. But the name does not really matter, the connections between the wires are an accurate presentation of reality. Once you have such a wire-model you can throw out the words.
tiberious726 4y ago
Even early Wittgenstein was never a positivist. One of the reasons he quit philosophy for so long was his frustration at that interpretation of works (see some of the interactions between him and Russell for example). What you are describing is exactly the opposite of what he was trying to say. If you're interested in another (much better) take on him, look into "the resolute reading", especially Cora Diamond and James Conant. The lead editor of the SEP is a big Frege guy, and unfortunately, the site is extremely biased on anything tangentially related to Frege, and unfortunately this is one of those areas.
- dvt 4y ago
  > Even early Wittgenstein was never a positivist. This is a very dubious claim, and you'd probably never hear the end of it if you claimed this in a graduate philosophy course at any reputable university. (There's probably some arguments to be made here, but still.) Of course, Wittgenstein later changed his course, but he was instrumental in popularizing logical positivism in its early days, unwittingly or not. The Tractatus was like contraband.
  - tiberious726 4y ago
    Graduate courses in philosophy at a top-tier department was where I learned it, lol. If you're interested, I can't recommend Cora Diamond's and James Conant's works on Wittgenstein enough (and "the resolute reading" in general). And would also strongly suggest not listening too closely to any modern author who thinks Russel understood Wittgenstein at any point (Wittgenstein certainly _never_ thought so).
sdwr 4y ago
I don't like this explanation. It's putting him in a box that doesn't fit. Wittgenstein tested the boundaries of logic, and certainly didn't cheerlead for it. His thoughts on group classification are the most crisp refutation of classic logic I've ever heard, far better than Godel. Godel worked inside the system, Wittgenstein challenged it from the outside.

by dvt 4y ago

galaxyLogic 4y ago

There is a correspondence between words and reality. When you explain something you do it with words and then you must define those words. Once you understand some "model" it does not matter what are the words you gave to the components of the whole and the relations between them. You would create such a model out of colored wires. You could attach a note to each wire giving it a name. But the name does not really matter, the connections between the wires are an accurate presentation of reality. Once you have such a wire-model you can throw out the words.

tiberious726 4y ago

Even early Wittgenstein was never a positivist. One of the reasons he quit philosophy for so long was his frustration at that interpretation of works (see some of the interactions between him and Russell for example). What you are describing is exactly the opposite of what he was trying to say. If you're interested in another (much better) take on him, look into "the resolute reading", especially Cora Diamond and James Conant. The lead editor of the SEP is a big Frege guy, and unfortunately, the site is extremely biased on anything tangentially related to Frege, and unfortunately this is one of those areas.

dvt 4y ago
> Even early Wittgenstein was never a positivist. This is a very dubious claim, and you'd probably never hear the end of it if you claimed this in a graduate philosophy course at any reputable university. (There's probably some arguments to be made here, but still.) Of course, Wittgenstein later changed his course, but he was instrumental in popularizing logical positivism in its early days, unwittingly or not. The Tractatus was like contraband.
- tiberious726 4y ago
  Graduate courses in philosophy at a top-tier department was where I learned it, lol. If you're interested, I can't recommend Cora Diamond's and James Conant's works on Wittgenstein enough (and "the resolute reading" in general). And would also strongly suggest not listening too closely to any modern author who thinks Russel understood Wittgenstein at any point (Wittgenstein certainly _never_ thought so).

sdwr 4y ago

I don't like this explanation. It's putting him in a box that doesn't fit. Wittgenstein tested the boundaries of logic, and certainly didn't cheerlead for it. His thoughts on group classification are the most crisp refutation of classic logic I've ever heard, far better than Godel. Godel worked inside the system, Wittgenstein challenged it from the outside.