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Generally I feel like I'm pretty good at understanding concepts. But after reading this Wikipedia page and then Googling it and then reading MollyRealized's Ch
by crazygringo 4y ago
Generally I feel like I'm pretty good at understanding concepts.
But after reading this Wikipedia page and then Googling it and then reading MollyRealized's ChatGPT explanation in a sibling comment...
...I have utterly no idea what the heck this is supposed to be.
If this is about using nonsense to explain something in philosophy, that seems awfully silly.
If this is about how e.g. high school students need simplified versions of how an electron works (a point) before college students learn the reality (a cloud), then it seems banal.
If this is about achieving mystical realizations along the lines of zen koans, then OK but what has that got to do with Wittgenstein? And it seems like a Wikipedia article ought to mention this.
So I'm baffled. I think I need a ladder to help me understand this ladder? And understand why this was submitted to HN in the first place?
- nomilk 4y ago> how high school students need simplified versions That's how I interpreted it. One problem with 'ladders' (i.e. intentional use of simplified explanations) is that if someone is taught the simplification but never realises there's more to it, they can think they know how something works when in fact they don't, which could be worse than not knowing at all. That set of qualities (being wrong but certain they're right) reminds me of the 'midwit' meme.
- skyechurch 4y agoThe Tractatus is about the limits of language/thought/the world (as a formal logical system), and the primary result of the argument in the Tractatus is that you can technically say nothing sensible about meaning or the world itself from within it, and the natural result of this is that the Tractatus is, itself, as an attempt to describe the world/language/thought itself, from a formal point of view, nonsense. Having said that, there are points of view outside of formal logic, where the Tractatus apparently and essentially all "philosophical" questions, which perhaps we can view now (from the ladder), although we cannot and probably should not say anything about them, as it is impossible. This is somewhere between the End of Philosophy and mystical gibberish, and while it sounds like that's an important distinction to make, by the rules of the game it is a nonsense distinction, so here we are. Wittgenstein essentially rejected this view a decade later, so if he felt no obligation to abide by the paradoxical inconclusions of the Tractatus, neither should we. But it's a remarkable, frustrating little book in any case. ... >And understand why this was submitted to HN in the first place? The implications of this to formal logical systems is enormous: Gödel's theorem is rubbished*, AI consciousness is impossible*, the meaning of the world lies outside of the world and so our lives have to be oriented at some technically nonexistent point beyond the horizon of reality to have any hope of escaping the absurdity of sensibleness.* After writing this in a WW1 POW camp he quit philosophy (because he had ended it) and became a (very bad) elementary school teacher and then spent several years designing a doorknob[1], as one does. *one could argue https://www.nybooks.com/online/2016/05/24/wittgensteins-handles/ https://www.nybooks.com/online/2016/05/24/wittgensteins-hand...
- lqet 4y ago> Gödel's theorem is rubbished I am curious, could you elaborate a bit on this? If the Tractatus is about the inability to say something about a system from within the system, then isn't this basically what Gödel's theorem is about?
- galaxyLogic 4y agoI'm curious too. Can we right-away accept the proposition that "A Sentence can refer to itself"? If a sentence refers to 'this sentence', what does it in fact precisely refer to? And what is the "it" that does the referring? Maybe, a "sentence" can not refer to anything. It is the person uttering the sentence that does the referring. But then of course when he or she says "this sentence" they would really mean, me, this person.
- skyechurch 4y agoWith the warning that I am not an expert, see my answer below. While there is obviously thematic overlap between the Tractatus and Gödel, Wittgenstein himself viewed Gödel's work as fundamentally nonsensical. Now why the "nonsense" of the Tractatus is ok, while the "nonsense" of Gödel is not, is admittedly not clear, and we are under no obligation to respect it, but that would be (early) Wittgenstein's opinion.
- tiberious726 4y agoI studied Wittgenstein and the philosophy of AI/Computation for years. I don't see how any of those conclusions in your last paragraph follow from his work. (If anything, Godels incompleteness can be found as a trival result of Wittgenstein's arguments.)
- LanceH 4y agoGiven sufficient axioms, I can make any theorem trivial.
- skyechurch 4y agoFirst of all, I would be very interested to hear your thoughts and references on this subject, as I am no kind of expert in any of this. Wittgenstein clearly did not feel the incompleteness theorem followed from his (or Russell's) work[1][2], this is generally considered to be an issue of Wittgenstein misunderstanding Gödel, but I think this isn't correct. From the POV of the Tractatus Wittgenstein, unprovable formal statements amount to "undecidable" conditions in the physical world, an absolute impossibility. These are, like Russell's paradox, language problems - we have not defined our terms clearly. [1] https://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-6-issue-1-article-6.annotate https://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-6-issue-1-art... [2] https://www.cantorsparadise.com/wittgenstein-didnt-absolutely-agree-with-g%C3%B6del-s-theorems-and-russell-s-paradox-and-he-was-right-a5883750f925 https://www.cantorsparadise.com/wittgenstein-didnt-absolutel...
- DiscourseFan 4y agoI hope this doesn't sound too mystical woo-woo to you, but its not about understanding concepts, its about understanding what happens after concepts. There is more to life than logic, and logic, while useful, should help one to understand that.
- mistermann 4y agoI think some forms of logic can navigate this problem space, but not the intuitive kind that our heuristics run on, which is what people who operate on a scientific materialist metaphysical framework cannot avoid using (until they learn how, that is). A more intuitive way for programmers to come at it may be this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_loop https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_loop
- Buldak 4y agoWittgenstein tries to explain how language works, how it represents the world. One consequence of his theory is that language cannot represent that relationship itself. (At one point, he compares this limitation to the way that an eye necessarily can't see itself.) Well, if you believe that, what's the point of writing the Tractatus? So the ladder metaphor is supposed to suggest that contemplating the Tractatus might lead the reader to grasp the nature of language, even as they ultimately realize that a book can't really depict that straightforwardly. One source which I've found very accessible on this topic is Bryan Magee's interviews of John Searle: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrmPq8pzG9Q&list=PLB72977AF40E22E0F https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrmPq8pzG9Q&list=PLB72977AF4...
- IIAOPSW 4y agoHold up. You can see your eye just fine by looking in a mirror. Where's the problem?
- yencabulator 4y agoEven better, you absolutely see things in your eye. They're called "floaters". Your brain learns to mostly ignore them. And if you develop cataracts, your vision tends to "yellow", and you'll be seeing more and more of the lens of your eye, as it becomes less transparent. Cataract surgery (= replacing natural lens with plastic lens) can lead to the operated eye seeing "bright" and un-operated one "yellow".
- beyonddream 4y agoI think parent comment meant that one can’t use the eye to see itself directly without using any intermediaries like mirror or photograph.
- IIAOPSW 4y agoObviously, but why isn't the use of an intermediary allowed in this metaphor?
- 4y ago
- hgsgm 4y ago> this is about how e.g. high school students need simplified versions of how an electron works (a point) before college students learn the reality (a cloud), then it seems banal Why is it banal? Just because you already understand it? It's an important idea that comes up all over education, and isn't often explicitly mentioned.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- prvc 4y ago>If this is about achieving mystical realizations along the lines of zen koans, then OK but what has that got to do with Wittgenstein? The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is, in my view, a mystical text. Its use of mathematical-like notation and arguments make it seem like something akin to Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, or Language, Truth, and Logic, but it is really quite different, with totally different aims and methods. It is not aiming to prove or instill in the reader any kind of propositional knowledge, despite its format. The statements at either end of the text (1. and 6.) are often quite obscure in their meaning. The point is, in my view, to induce the reader to change his mindset, and to discard his previous philosophical beliefs, rather than to acquire new ones.
- tiberious726 4y agoIt's very much intended to be a tearing down of such projects "from the inside". Back in the day, philosophers _actually_ _believed_ they could write down a series of proposition that fully and completely described reality. They even thought they were discovering the fundamental nature of reality with whatever new symbolic logic notation they came up with that week. I guess they stopped making people read Kant for a while there... These were solved problems
- sdwr 4y agoClosest to koans, but more practical, less of a blind leap. The intermediate work is required to reach the goal, but not useful once there. Like releasing a sex tape to get famous.
- phendrenad2 4y agoYeesh. Not a single good explanation here. The only reason the "point" version of electrons is a valid "step" on the ladder to the "cloud" version of electrons, is it's plausible. You are capable of fully believing it before recognizing it as bullshit once you use it as a foundation to learn the next step. Such intermediary steps aren't easy to create. The best ones come from history, from time periods where we had an outdated but plausible theory (point to cloud electrons, flat earth to round earth, etc.) The "step" is a flat surface you can stand on. Ever try to learn some math concept from wikipedia? It's impossible, right? To understand X you must understand Y, and to understand Y you must understand X. You break this cycle by telling the learner "Don't look into Y, it's already a solved problem, just trust me". Then they can focus on X and fully learn it without being distracted.
- ly3xqhl8g9 4y agoPerhaps Foucault could make things a bit clearer, which as philosophy goes, the clear is always muddier, muddled with more questions: "I don't say the things I say because they are what I think, I say them as a way to make sure they no longer are what I think. [...] To be really certain that from now on, outside of me, they are going to live or die in such a way that I will not have to recognize myself in them." [1] One other thing, pertaining to philosophers and learning, is to account for the distinction between "learning" and "training" or even "taming". Learning is something which comes from inside, Plato would call it anamnesis [2], a kind of remembering of innate knowledge, having Socrates show that a slave already knew mathematics in the dialogue Meno. Whereas, training and taming are always outside pressures. This is one of the reasons why Plato hated sophists, or if he could, despised the self-help literature of today: help, knowledge, learning can only come from inside [3]. This is also why Plato would say "machine learning" is a misnomer, the machine doesn't learn from an inside, but it is forced by us, the outside, to learn, even in unsupervised learning, it's actually "machine training". [4] Hence why Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard (and even Heidegger) advise against thinking that one can learn to be from someone else: authenticity is a process, not a fact. [1] From minute 14, but the whole interview is interesting, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzoOhhh4aJg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzoOhhh4aJg [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anamnesis_(philosophy) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anamnesis_(philosophy) [3] An example of this in micro would be a transistor (or a voltage-gated ion channel): once they establish their form, being able to switch states between 0 and 1, suddenly they have access to an entire new realm, the truth table, which was always there, somewhere (Plato would call this ἰδέα, form, idea [https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BC%B0%CE%B4%CE%AD%CE%B1 https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BC%B0%CE%B4%CE%AD%CE%B1]). [4] Just to get political for a second: this is also why "police training" and "military training" will only produce sociopathic, murderous, PTSD-stricken shells of a human being: an external force, the state, the tradition, sociopathic leaders, sociopathic societies, is obliterating any sense of internal learning, from empathic de-escalation to removal of the preconditions of violence altogether.
- woolion 4y agoSo from mathematical logic we know that if you take a simple statement you can have a formal statement equivalent to it[0]. For example, 'not all frogs are green', or 'quadrupeds are four-legged animals'. For the logical form there is a mathematical procedure that let's you verify its meaning (reduction in lambda-calculus, or equivalently a proof tree). However, these statements are not very interesting![1] So what are 'interesting statements'? That would be something that has some deeper meaning, philosophical ideas (let's call them 'general ideas'). If we wanted to use the same approach, we would need to encode all the necessary concepts through predicates or compose them in logic functions or formula fragments. Of course, to arrive at a concept such as 'philosophy' the endeavor would be enormous. Even if you managed to do it, would your encoding be recognized as 'philosophy' by everyone else? Instead, we communicate with these general statements that requires that you reduce them to simpler statement that actually mean something. Let's take 'the early bird gets the worm'. You need to take some examples to think 'what does it mean in this situation'? You can try to falsify and work with it like a hypothesis. You get some understanding from that process and not from the statement itself. Can it be called the meaning of the statement? Not really, because there is no way to associate to a simple mathematical process, it depends on each individual's mental process. And given that, how can you be sure of what exactly is the idea that you're communicating? If you understand these general ideas, and that you cannot communicate them except to people that already understood them, these statements are meaningless in a certain sense [2]. You can say that "but we communicate about these things all the time". But how well? There's a an anecdote due to Lucian about two people talking to each others without really understanding anything, so he went to them and asked "doesn't it seem to you that one is trying to milk a billygoat and the other is handing him a colander?". [0] you just need to provide a precise definition for all terms and associate a predicate for each property of interest. It's a slog to do but it's something that is done, for example in engineering when you need some safety properties. [1] That was identified as the inanity of mathematics; you can only prove tautologies. In a way what you can salvage from this procedure is that some statements are meaningful, whereas some are not (e.g. Russel's paradox) [2] A concept that helps is Quine's "indeterminacy of translation"
- lisp-pornstar 4y agoWittgenstein's Tractatus is about "playing" philosophy, using its rule, until we prove that what has been said since the beginning is pure non-sense.
- lisp-pornstar 4y agoThink about proving that a problem cannot be solved in maths.
- pfortuny 4y agoThe problem with Wittgenstein is that his terms are very specific and their meaning is very precise. When one reads “nonsensical” in that sentence one tends to think “ah, so they are stupid” whereas he likely means “they do not represent the world” (no-sense: without reference), which for Wittgenstein is true because language is unable to grasp “the thing itself” (the “state of affairs, in his terminology). That is my understanding anyway.