2 ms·
Yes, but they will have to un-pin the (now compromised) key if they want to continue using Github. Any compromise would have to isolate them from the "real" Gi
by lxgr 4y ago
Yes, but they will have to un-pin the (now compromised) key if they want to continue using Github.
Any compromise would have to isolate them from the "real" Github hosts from today onwards, i.e. plausibly MITM them continuously, or they would just switch to the rotated key to be able to continue working. At least in OpenSSH, this means replacing the compromised trusted key, as there can only be one per host (or even IP in the default configuration).
This is still very bad, but much less catastrophic than e.g. a world in which `.ssh/known_hosts` allows multiple entries, in which case you'd really have a sustained compromise of most clients.
- lxgr 4y agoWoah, I looked around some more and it seems like the opposite is true. Multiple trusted keys per domain can exist, and additionally there is this option: > UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default UserKnownHostsFile setting and has not enabled VerifyHostKeyDNS, otherwise UpdateHostKeys will be set to no. This is an OpenSSH extension that allows any host to provide additional host keys the client will then silently add to `known_hosts`. This is really bad in this context as it can allow a one-time MITM to install rogue keys for github.com that can go unnoticed; check your `known_hosts` for any unexpected entries for github.com!