> I'm not here to disprove Neumann. You are arguing on the basis of possibility of imprecision in language that the choice to be more precise does not contribu

> I'm not here to disprove Neumann. You are arguing on the basis of possibility of imprecision in language that the choice to be more precise does not contribute anything. That structure - whether you want it to or not - as a direct consequence of logic applies to every thinker who ever argued for precision due to the possibility of ambiguity. It is an argument against formal systems, programming languages, measurement, and more. Some of the time it will turn out that your conclusion was true. Other times it will not. So the argument structure itself is invalid. Your conclusions do not follow from your premises. Try your blade - your argument structure - against steel rather than straw. I saw you slice through straw with it. So I picked up the blade after you set it down and tried to slice it through steel. The blade failed to do so. The blade is cheap, prone to shattering, and unsuited for use in a serious contest between ideas. For what it is worth - I do happen to agree with you that Lanier is making a mistake here. I think it is in the logical equivalence mismatch. He wants intelligence to be comparable to running, not to motion more generally, but since intelligence is actually more comparable to compression we can talk of different implementations of the process using terms like artificial or natural intelligence without being fallacious for much the same reason we can talk about different compression algorithms and still be talking about compression. So instead of trying to argue from his distinction between motion in general and motion in humans, I would think the place to point to for contradiction is the existence of cheetah runners versus human runners. Directly contradicting his insinuation is that we actually do say that cheetah are faster runners than humans.