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> two hydrogen bombs dropped over North Carolina, one comes close to detonation I think this part is BS. Nuclear weapons don’t detonate on accident, it require

> two hydrogen bombs dropped over North Carolina, one comes close to detonation I think this part is BS. Nuclear weapons don’t detonate on accident, it requires delicate synchronized process, guarded by authorization codes which aren’t normally present on the launch platform itself. Without authorization codes a nuclear weapon is just a big slightly radioactive pile of metal.

photonbeam 4y ago
Codes were probably just 0000 anyway
- gumby 4y ago
  This situation doesn’t seem to be widely known.
  - Kranar 4y ago
    Because it's almost certainly false. The source for this is Bruce Blair, who while is a credible source on matters of nuclear armament, would not have been privy to this information. The DoD has refuted the claim made by Dr. Blair also insisting that he was never in a position or authorized to know these codes. Furthermore, the House Armed Services Committee which investigated this matter was unable to find anyone else to corroborate the claim. If Dr. Blair's claims were true, there would certainly be one other officer (retired by now) who would be able to confirm it as part of a Congressional investigation, and yet everyone who was in a position to know this has said the claim is false.
khuey 4y ago
Were they guarded by authorization codes in 1961 when that incident happened? Kennedy's executive order to install PALs on nuclear weapons just in Europe was in 1962. The early days of nuclear weapons were the wild west.
- quickthrowman 4y ago
  > The early days of nuclear weapons were the wild west. They certainly were! Once we had a working bomb, we first used it to blow up cities and people. After that, we decided that uninhabited islands and atolls were our real enemy, and bombed those instead of cities and people. Now we don’t even blow up the bombs anymore, we just pretend to blow them up on computers.
lelandfe 4y ago
> One simple, dynamo-technology low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe! > [the] bomb did not possess adequate safety... The unalterable conflusion is that the only effective safing device during airborne alert was the ready-safe switch > If a short to an "arm" line occurred in a mid-air breakup, a postulate that seems credible, the Mk 39 Mod 2 bomb could have given a nuclear burst. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/796426-goldsboro-revisited-pp-1-2-copy.html#document/p2 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/796426-goldsboro-rev... Parker Jones, nuclear weapons safety specialist at Sandia National Laboratories in a formerly-classified 1969 document obtained by FOIA in 2013. Request was actually made by Eric Schlosser during his writing of Command and Control, the book GP mentions: https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/goldsboro-revisited-declassified-document https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/go...
- ttyprintk 4y ago
  Iirc, 3 of the 4 safety systems had tripped. This switch is an actual, wired switch. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/warfare/id1526490428?i=1000598970332 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/warfare/id1526490428?i...
ms512 4y ago
The book referenced in the original comment (Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety) specifically digs in to the limitations behind the safety mechanisms. Specific to the incident here, only 1 of 4 safety mechanisms prevented an catastrophic incident. The details in the wikipedia page [1] about this incident is well worth a read. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
nukeman 4y ago
Older nuclear weapons were not nearly as hardened as modern ones. For a good introduction, I recommend Sandia’s three part documentary Always/Never: The Quest for Safety, Control, and Survivability. t. DOE contractor

photonbeam 4y ago

Codes were probably just 0000 anyway

gumby 4y ago
This situation doesn’t seem to be widely known.
- Kranar 4y ago
  Because it's almost certainly false. The source for this is Bruce Blair, who while is a credible source on matters of nuclear armament, would not have been privy to this information. The DoD has refuted the claim made by Dr. Blair also insisting that he was never in a position or authorized to know these codes. Furthermore, the House Armed Services Committee which investigated this matter was unable to find anyone else to corroborate the claim. If Dr. Blair's claims were true, there would certainly be one other officer (retired by now) who would be able to confirm it as part of a Congressional investigation, and yet everyone who was in a position to know this has said the claim is false.

khuey 4y ago

Were they guarded by authorization codes in 1961 when that incident happened? Kennedy's executive order to install PALs on nuclear weapons just in Europe was in 1962. The early days of nuclear weapons were the wild west.

quickthrowman 4y ago
> The early days of nuclear weapons were the wild west. They certainly were! Once we had a working bomb, we first used it to blow up cities and people. After that, we decided that uninhabited islands and atolls were our real enemy, and bombed those instead of cities and people. Now we don’t even blow up the bombs anymore, we just pretend to blow them up on computers.

lelandfe 4y ago

> One simple, dynamo-technology low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe! > [the] bomb did not possess adequate safety... The unalterable conflusion is that the only effective safing device during airborne alert was the ready-safe switch > If a short to an "arm" line occurred in a mid-air breakup, a postulate that seems credible, the Mk 39 Mod 2 bomb could have given a nuclear burst. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/796426-goldsboro-revisited-pp-1-2-copy.html#document/p2 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/796426-goldsboro-rev... Parker Jones, nuclear weapons safety specialist at Sandia National Laboratories in a formerly-classified 1969 document obtained by FOIA in 2013. Request was actually made by Eric Schlosser during his writing of Command and Control, the book GP mentions: https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/goldsboro-revisited-declassified-document https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/20/go...

ttyprintk 4y ago
Iirc, 3 of the 4 safety systems had tripped. This switch is an actual, wired switch. https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/warfare/id1526490428?i=1000598970332 https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/warfare/id1526490428?i...

ms512 4y ago

The book referenced in the original comment (Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety) specifically digs in to the limitations behind the safety mechanisms. Specific to the incident here, only 1 of 4 safety mechanisms prevented an catastrophic incident. The details in the wikipedia page [1] about this incident is well worth a read. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_Goldsboro_B-52_crash

deleted 4y ago
[deleted]

nukeman 4y ago

Older nuclear weapons were not nearly as hardened as modern ones. For a good introduction, I recommend Sandia’s three part documentary Always/Never: The Quest for Safety, Control, and Survivability. t. DOE contractor