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Causality isn't broken; the universe is "simultaneously causal and teleological," because it's superdetermined. There also isn't any free will, because there i

Causality isn't broken; the universe is "simultaneously causal and teleological," because it's superdetermined. There also isn't any free will, because there isn't actually any agent who could have it. Actions we perceive as volitional actually arise in the brain up to 7s before we "choose" them. The sense of a "me" is a post hoc add-on that claims credit for everything, in order to unite the disparate phenomena that comprise the sense of self. There isn't actually any "me," and recognizing this is what the word "enlightenment" refers to.

marcus_holmes 4y ago
Again this seems like a "God of the gaps" thing - if this universe isn't strictly deterministic then it's superdetermined by a meta universe, and so on
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- lupire 4y ago
  What if the "so on" is infinite?
  - marcus_holmes 4y ago
    Turtles all the way down ;)
- electrondood 4y ago
  I think it's the opposite. You need a "God of the gaps" in the form of a "person" (actually a collection of phenomena. + the phenomena of identification with these) to explain free will and agency, which defies experimental evidence. The comment that superdeterminism requires a higher-order determinism, which itself requires a yet-higher-order determinism... I think you're confusing it with a causal mindset. If the universe is effectively a recording, why does it need any ultimate cause? Causal thinking would only make sense from a perspective within that recording. Of course we want to know "why is any of this here?" But what if the ultimate question doesn't actually have an answer?
JoshCole 4y ago
> There also isn't any free will, because there isn't actually any agent who could have it. The compilation of each possible Play in an Extensive Normal Form Game into a cellular automata can constitute a refutation by counterexample of your claim. It satisfies the agent condition through congruence with the technical language defining the concept of agent in artificial intelligence literature as it relates to agents in multi-agent multi-step decision theory problems. The condition of non-deterministic policies is found and shown to be optimal by Nash's justification for an mixed strategy equilibrium. The underlying mathematics that leads there is proven via Russel and there exists various proofs of the desiderata of probability from others which can begin atop that. Furthermore by compiling the formal system to get a physical system we create the ability for a logical analogy between the formal system and the physical system through Aristotle's analogical congruence concepts. We can count the cell configurations and we can count the transitional structure, but this is mostly a formality since we know through the definition of the compilation that they must agree. As far as I can tell at every single step in the laddering up there are proofs from the basics of logic to the mathematics to the use of probability to the justification through utility theory and even to the computational universality necessary to create the physical embedding of the agent in our reality. The prior conception of guess appears laughable posterior to computation and comparison with evidence, but is just science prior and seeing it is wrong is hindsight bias posterior. It might sound laughable, but it is actually the case that it is not a laughing matter [1]. In like manner, but slightly different and perilously close to being anti-scientific is that you don't know until the observation whether guesses would go one way or another. [1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw
- electrondood 4y ago
  I'm saying your self-concept is only a useful abstraction. It's an evolutionally beneficial illusion that there is any entity called "me" that chooses which action comes next.
  - JoshCole 4y ago
    I get what you are trying to say, but it isn't true. This is the long version that explains why and goes through the implications at each step showing the hypothesis, predictions they make, and why your views don't make sense. You should read this if you don't think my other post makes sense, but if it just clicks you don't need to read this. H0: Free will predicts in advance of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you cannot always predict the result. H1: A lack of free will predicts of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you can always have predicted the result in advance of the result, because there was only one possible resolution. Complete Refutation of H1: The existence of halting problems. A self-reference in a decision problem refutes H1, because the self-reference Additional strong evidence against H1: All the most successful epistemological frameworks suppose a superposition over positions which on attaining information about the next position resolves, not to a position, but to a new superposition. For example science does this. It believes we don't know for certain the theories, but we conjecture guesses and use observations to test them. Implication of failure of H1 and the failure to refute H0: There exists a self-reference, a sort of self-concept, which prevents the resolution of a prediction prior to the resolution. Self-reference exists as a thing which must be computed. Okay. So now we pick back up in the mathematics that deals with self-reference in game theory. In it we find equilibrium concepts which are defined with respect to self-reference and proven relative to self-reference considerations. These proofs show that the solution structure contingent on self-reference is non-deterministic. Implication: Not only does self-reference exist, but the consequences of self-reference is the use of self-reference to refute self-referential prediction or to support self-referential prediction on the basis of utility of doing so or not doing so. So now we know a self-reference must exist, we also know it predicts a refutation in some cases of the ability to predict it. We can also see that if the self-reference didn't exist, it would imply that there was no structure which wasn't computationally irreducible like self-reference structures are. H3: We will see everything is predictable from the information contexts available, because agents don't exist. Example predictions: that all physics will be determinable like the position of a planet is determinable. H4: We will that some things are not predictable, because of the existence of illusions that prevent resolution and which contain a self-reference consideration. What we actually observe is H4. We observe H4 in at least one case, so we can't infer from H3 that we can reject H4, because H4 already rejects the safety of H3. Let me give an example: Some deer in Africa don't see orange. Tigers, to us, are orange. To the deer they are green. The tiger color is decided by a self-reference consideration with the deer perceptual system. The deer is not going to be able to predict the future state of all tiger like we could predict the planets, because the deer is caught in a superposition with respect to a tiger's presence. When it observes a tiger, this looks the same as observing a bush. Therefore, even if it sees a bush, it can't predict that it can always model the consequence of a bush. Therefore, if we see a planet, it is incorrect to assume we can always predict the consequences of seeing a planet. So now you can understand, if my other comment didn't click, why appeals to illusion are actually evidence for self-reference, not evidence against it. So feel free to read that comment again to see if it now clicks.
lupire 4y ago
And yet doesn't it defy probability that such raw physical determinism would lead to us having this discussion? And if not, is it not amazing that simple subatomic physical applied to a gaseous soup leads to us discussing these questions?
- electrondood 4y ago
  To the first question, not in the least. This discussion is also superdetermined, including the illusory sense of a "me" who "chose" to write these comments. To the second question, yes. It's beyond comprehension and wondrous. It's maximum novelty and total absurdity.
  - JoshCole 4y ago
    Might be worth it to brush up on computationally reducible phenomenon and computationally irreducible phenomenon. Breaking determined systems into these constituent parts lets you conjecture with respect to intelligent agents. Critically it shows that arguments from observed inability to successfully model the self are evidence for, not evidence against, the presence of an intelligent agent. The enlightenment view misattributes the evidence for agents as evidence against agents. An anti-enlightenment koan could be: The student came to the master and asked, “Why are tigers green?” The master responded, “The deer they are hunting can’t see orange.” The student then asked, “It is not therefore it is? How mysterious and inscrutable your answers!” But from that moment onwards the master was de-enlightened.

marcus_holmes 4y ago

Again this seems like a "God of the gaps" thing - if this universe isn't strictly deterministic then it's superdetermined by a meta universe, and so on

deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
lupire 4y ago
What if the "so on" is infinite?
- marcus_holmes 4y ago
  Turtles all the way down ;)
electrondood 4y ago
I think it's the opposite. You need a "God of the gaps" in the form of a "person" (actually a collection of phenomena. + the phenomena of identification with these) to explain free will and agency, which defies experimental evidence. The comment that superdeterminism requires a higher-order determinism, which itself requires a yet-higher-order determinism... I think you're confusing it with a causal mindset. If the universe is effectively a recording, why does it need any ultimate cause? Causal thinking would only make sense from a perspective within that recording. Of course we want to know "why is any of this here?" But what if the ultimate question doesn't actually have an answer?

JoshCole 4y ago

> There also isn't any free will, because there isn't actually any agent who could have it. The compilation of each possible Play in an Extensive Normal Form Game into a cellular automata can constitute a refutation by counterexample of your claim. It satisfies the agent condition through congruence with the technical language defining the concept of agent in artificial intelligence literature as it relates to agents in multi-agent multi-step decision theory problems. The condition of non-deterministic policies is found and shown to be optimal by Nash's justification for an mixed strategy equilibrium. The underlying mathematics that leads there is proven via Russel and there exists various proofs of the desiderata of probability from others which can begin atop that. Furthermore by compiling the formal system to get a physical system we create the ability for a logical analogy between the formal system and the physical system through Aristotle's analogical congruence concepts. We can count the cell configurations and we can count the transitional structure, but this is mostly a formality since we know through the definition of the compilation that they must agree. As far as I can tell at every single step in the laddering up there are proofs from the basics of logic to the mathematics to the use of probability to the justification through utility theory and even to the computational universality necessary to create the physical embedding of the agent in our reality. The prior conception of guess appears laughable posterior to computation and comparison with evidence, but is just science prior and seeing it is wrong is hindsight bias posterior. It might sound laughable, but it is actually the case that it is not a laughing matter [1]. In like manner, but slightly different and perilously close to being anti-scientific is that you don't know until the observation whether guesses would go one way or another. [1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYPapE-3FRw

electrondood 4y ago
I'm saying your self-concept is only a useful abstraction. It's an evolutionally beneficial illusion that there is any entity called "me" that chooses which action comes next.
- JoshCole 4y ago
  I get what you are trying to say, but it isn't true. This is the long version that explains why and goes through the implications at each step showing the hypothesis, predictions they make, and why your views don't make sense. You should read this if you don't think my other post makes sense, but if it just clicks you don't need to read this. H0: Free will predicts in advance of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you cannot always predict the result. H1: A lack of free will predicts of a decision problem that when a decision problem is resolved you can always have predicted the result in advance of the result, because there was only one possible resolution. Complete Refutation of H1: The existence of halting problems. A self-reference in a decision problem refutes H1, because the self-reference Additional strong evidence against H1: All the most successful epistemological frameworks suppose a superposition over positions which on attaining information about the next position resolves, not to a position, but to a new superposition. For example science does this. It believes we don't know for certain the theories, but we conjecture guesses and use observations to test them. Implication of failure of H1 and the failure to refute H0: There exists a self-reference, a sort of self-concept, which prevents the resolution of a prediction prior to the resolution. Self-reference exists as a thing which must be computed. Okay. So now we pick back up in the mathematics that deals with self-reference in game theory. In it we find equilibrium concepts which are defined with respect to self-reference and proven relative to self-reference considerations. These proofs show that the solution structure contingent on self-reference is non-deterministic. Implication: Not only does self-reference exist, but the consequences of self-reference is the use of self-reference to refute self-referential prediction or to support self-referential prediction on the basis of utility of doing so or not doing so. So now we know a self-reference must exist, we also know it predicts a refutation in some cases of the ability to predict it. We can also see that if the self-reference didn't exist, it would imply that there was no structure which wasn't computationally irreducible like self-reference structures are. H3: We will see everything is predictable from the information contexts available, because agents don't exist. Example predictions: that all physics will be determinable like the position of a planet is determinable. H4: We will that some things are not predictable, because of the existence of illusions that prevent resolution and which contain a self-reference consideration. What we actually observe is H4. We observe H4 in at least one case, so we can't infer from H3 that we can reject H4, because H4 already rejects the safety of H3. Let me give an example: Some deer in Africa don't see orange. Tigers, to us, are orange. To the deer they are green. The tiger color is decided by a self-reference consideration with the deer perceptual system. The deer is not going to be able to predict the future state of all tiger like we could predict the planets, because the deer is caught in a superposition with respect to a tiger's presence. When it observes a tiger, this looks the same as observing a bush. Therefore, even if it sees a bush, it can't predict that it can always model the consequence of a bush. Therefore, if we see a planet, it is incorrect to assume we can always predict the consequences of seeing a planet. So now you can understand, if my other comment didn't click, why appeals to illusion are actually evidence for self-reference, not evidence against it. So feel free to read that comment again to see if it now clicks.

lupire 4y ago

And yet doesn't it defy probability that such raw physical determinism would lead to us having this discussion? And if not, is it not amazing that simple subatomic physical applied to a gaseous soup leads to us discussing these questions?

electrondood 4y ago
To the first question, not in the least. This discussion is also superdetermined, including the illusory sense of a "me" who "chose" to write these comments. To the second question, yes. It's beyond comprehension and wondrous. It's maximum novelty and total absurdity.
- JoshCole 4y ago
  Might be worth it to brush up on computationally reducible phenomenon and computationally irreducible phenomenon. Breaking determined systems into these constituent parts lets you conjecture with respect to intelligent agents. Critically it shows that arguments from observed inability to successfully model the self are evidence for, not evidence against, the presence of an intelligent agent. The enlightenment view misattributes the evidence for agents as evidence against agents. An anti-enlightenment koan could be: The student came to the master and asked, “Why are tigers green?” The master responded, “The deer they are hunting can’t see orange.” The student then asked, “It is not therefore it is? How mysterious and inscrutable your answers!” But from that moment onwards the master was de-enlightened.