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If you're going to classify passwords as security through obscurity, then how would you accomplish security through any other means? All forms of digital securi

If you're going to classify passwords as security through obscurity, then how would you accomplish security through any other means? All forms of digital security require information asymmetry (IE someone holding information not known to others). The only other security I can think of is physical, and most of that is designed around information asymmetry as well (key cards, door codes). STO to me generally indicates there is some backward engineering process, or some vital related knowledge, that can break it, which is specifically not the case here. Secrets are specifically designed to have common forms and functions, you only keep the value itself, or values they were derived from, secret. Obscurity and secrecy have slightly different meanings.

shkkmo 4y ago
> If you're going to classify passwords as security through obscurity Sorry if this wasn't clear. I was trying to adopt your apparent definition to point out that, passwords and authorizing-links can have identical functional forms. Both depend on maintaining the secrecy of a specific piece on non-design / non-implementation knowledge. To make this clearer, let's say that your document's authorization link is determined by hashing the document id. If you don't use a salt, then the security of the system depends on the obscurity of your choice of hashing function. If you do use a salt, then your security also depends on the secrecy (and strength) of the salt value. Since the issue in this case wasn't people reverse engineering the means of generating links to uncover it, the issue was not a dependence on obscurity of design and implementation. The issue was that the users of the system were not aware or forgot that authorization links were a secret or confusion about what level of secrecy was needed for a specific link. This is why I specifically called out a possible design change to the authorization links that would reduce the likelihood of similar human error. Edit: In general, "security through obscurity" is both a nebulous term and one that often doesn't mean use of obscurity of design/implementation a portion of the security stance, but rather an over-reliance on obscurity of design/implementation without other security measures, such as the use and careful management of strong secrets such as passwords/keys. This potential confusion makes me view the "security through obscurity" term as more of a buzzword than a specific security criticism.
- NoZebra120vClip 4y ago
  > Both depend on maintaining the secrecy of a specific piece on non-design / non-implementation knowledge. I would say that Google Workspaces' implementation of "Anyone with the Link" authorization was never intended to depend on secrecy (or obscurity or what have-you). I would say that we'd need to consider a more expansive and open, permissive model than that. "Anyone who has the link can edit this" should not be considered as "hide this URL from anyone you don't want editing it" but rather "This is a world-writable document. Discovery merely depends on getting the link right." Imagine if this were a massively multiuser Unix system and not the WWW. Your admin creates for you an obscure, long pathname ending in a long base64 filename. It is mode 6777. "Anyone with the pathname" can edit it! Now is the pathname like a password, or is it just a pathname sitting there in the system? Arguably, Unix pathnames are more discoverable than arbitrary Docs links. But the idea is the same, isn't it? A Google Doc/Sheet/Slide/Drive whose permission is "Anyone with the link" may <X> is, when you boil it down, world-writable, no excuses, no ifs-ands-or-buts.
  - shkkmo 4y ago
    > Arguably, Unix pathnames are more discoverable than arbitrary Docs links. But the idea is the same, isn't it? The discoverability is a pretty key difference. If google had a feature that allowed you to enumerate all edit links in their system, then those links would effectively br world writeable. > I would say that Google Workspaces' implementation of "Anyone with the Link" authorization was never intended to depend on secrecy (or obscurity or what have-you). If that was true, the link would just use a document ID, the use of a cryptographic hash does imply some intention that these files won't simply be world writeable and that access is intended to be controlled by sharing of the link. In the specific case, the people using the feature failed to do either. They didn't treat the file as world writeable and they didn't treat the link like a secret. If they had done either, that would have helped.
- BobbyJo 4y ago
  > passwords and authorizing-links can have identical functional forms No they can't. Passwords are specifically intended not to be shared. Links are specifically intended to be shared. A shared secret is far less secure than one that is not shared, whether the cryptographic backing is the same or not.

shkkmo 4y ago

> If you're going to classify passwords as security through obscurity Sorry if this wasn't clear. I was trying to adopt your apparent definition to point out that, passwords and authorizing-links can have identical functional forms. Both depend on maintaining the secrecy of a specific piece on non-design / non-implementation knowledge. To make this clearer, let's say that your document's authorization link is determined by hashing the document id. If you don't use a salt, then the security of the system depends on the obscurity of your choice of hashing function. If you do use a salt, then your security also depends on the secrecy (and strength) of the salt value. Since the issue in this case wasn't people reverse engineering the means of generating links to uncover it, the issue was not a dependence on obscurity of design and implementation. The issue was that the users of the system were not aware or forgot that authorization links were a secret or confusion about what level of secrecy was needed for a specific link. This is why I specifically called out a possible design change to the authorization links that would reduce the likelihood of similar human error. Edit: In general, "security through obscurity" is both a nebulous term and one that often doesn't mean use of obscurity of design/implementation a portion of the security stance, but rather an over-reliance on obscurity of design/implementation without other security measures, such as the use and careful management of strong secrets such as passwords/keys. This potential confusion makes me view the "security through obscurity" term as more of a buzzword than a specific security criticism.

NoZebra120vClip 4y ago
> Both depend on maintaining the secrecy of a specific piece on non-design / non-implementation knowledge. I would say that Google Workspaces' implementation of "Anyone with the Link" authorization was never intended to depend on secrecy (or obscurity or what have-you). I would say that we'd need to consider a more expansive and open, permissive model than that. "Anyone who has the link can edit this" should not be considered as "hide this URL from anyone you don't want editing it" but rather "This is a world-writable document. Discovery merely depends on getting the link right." Imagine if this were a massively multiuser Unix system and not the WWW. Your admin creates for you an obscure, long pathname ending in a long base64 filename. It is mode 6777. "Anyone with the pathname" can edit it! Now is the pathname like a password, or is it just a pathname sitting there in the system? Arguably, Unix pathnames are more discoverable than arbitrary Docs links. But the idea is the same, isn't it? A Google Doc/Sheet/Slide/Drive whose permission is "Anyone with the link" may <X> is, when you boil it down, world-writable, no excuses, no ifs-ands-or-buts.
- shkkmo 4y ago
  > Arguably, Unix pathnames are more discoverable than arbitrary Docs links. But the idea is the same, isn't it? The discoverability is a pretty key difference. If google had a feature that allowed you to enumerate all edit links in their system, then those links would effectively br world writeable. > I would say that Google Workspaces' implementation of "Anyone with the Link" authorization was never intended to depend on secrecy (or obscurity or what have-you). If that was true, the link would just use a document ID, the use of a cryptographic hash does imply some intention that these files won't simply be world writeable and that access is intended to be controlled by sharing of the link. In the specific case, the people using the feature failed to do either. They didn't treat the file as world writeable and they didn't treat the link like a secret. If they had done either, that would have helped.
BobbyJo 4y ago
> passwords and authorizing-links can have identical functional forms No they can't. Passwords are specifically intended not to be shared. Links are specifically intended to be shared. A shared secret is far less secure than one that is not shared, whether the cryptographic backing is the same or not.