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It's coming from the same system that probably led you to work at Startups your whole career. High risk for high reward on a lightly regulated capitalist system
by belter 4y ago
It's coming from the same system that probably led you to work at Startups your whole career. High risk for high reward on a lightly regulated capitalist system. If your CEO or CFO put all the money in one risky bank, it was bad financial management.
- kemiller 4y agoMany were restricted by covenant with their investors to only use SVB.
- grugagag 4y agoId like to hear more about that.
- roflyear 4y agoI've heard it was mostly they had credit agreements with svb that required them to bank exclusively with svb
- eternalban 4y agoIs this correct then? : SVP gives easy credit to VC friends. VC friends use that credit as investment in startups who are told they must use SVP. So money moves from magic-money-printer -> SVP -> VC -> Startup -> SVP. Then SVP takes those deposits and invests it elsewhere. Now they are making money from loan to VC and reinvestment of those same monies that are deposited back. So a bank like SVP seems designed to enable VCs with easy credit to de-facto control an important (and balooning) niche of the economy and by their control over the beauty pageant of which startup idea gets money (and PR) they also control what kind of technology becomes dominant. (For example, these VCs share significant credit/blame for creating the surveillance tech. They share blame for creating an engineering culture that must serve full throttle growth business models. etc.) Is there a social graph of SVP and VCs involved? Are these people pals, friends, "effective" ideologues, etc.?
- belter 4y agoThat social graph is the definition of the VC ecosystem.
- roflyear 4y ago> VC friends use that credit as investment in startups who are told they must use SVP. Maybe, but I was talking specifically about startups themselves being given loans by SVB then requiring the startup to bank there. But I am sure investors also pushed startups to SVB... if your investor (who maybe is highly invested in SVB ... ) says "you should use this bank" are you going to say no? The pressure is immense. > Is there a social graph of SVP and VCs involved? Are these people pals, friends, "effective" ideologues, etc.? I'd be more surprised if they weren't.
- belter 4y agoBecause it was providing loans to the VCs and they saw it convenient, to force their startups there. High risk for High reward... "The rise and stunning fall of Silicon Valley Bank" - https://www.axios.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-rip https://www.axios.com/2023/03/11/silicon-valley-bank-rip
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- DoneWithAllThat 4y agoIt wasn’t a “risky bank”.
- belter 4y agoNot according to JP Morgan... - https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/silicon-valley-bank-failure-amv.pdf https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/ins... "The liability issue: extreme reliance on institutional/VC funding rather than traditional retail deposits. ...While capital, wholesale funding and loan to deposit ratios improved for many US banks since 2008, there are exceptions. As shown in the first chart, SIVB was in a league of its own: a high level of loans plus securities as a percentage of deposits, and very low reliance on stickier retail deposits as a share of total deposits. Bottom line: SIVB carved out a distinct and riskier niche than other banks, setting itself up for large potential capital shortfalls in case of rising interest rates, deposit outflows and forced asset sales. [Note: This chart appeared in our 2023 Outlook in a discussion on risks related to deposits, rising rates and quantitative tightening]..."
- capableweb 4y agoEverything is pointing towards that it was a risky bank, with a "unusually high reliance on corporate/VC funding". Maybe SVB themselves downplayed this? Take https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/insights/eye-on-the-market/silicon-valley-bank-failure-amv.pdf https://am.jpmorgan.com/content/dam/jpm-am-aem/global/en/ins... as an example: > The liabiity issue: extreme reliance on institutional/VC funding rather than traditional retail deposits > While capital, wholesale funding and loan to deposit ratios improved for many US banks since 2008, there are exceptions. As shown in the first chart, SIVB was in a league of its own: a high level of loans plus securities as a percentage of deposits, and very low reliance on stickier retail deposits as a share of total deposits. Bottom line: SIVB carved out a distinct and riskier niche than other banks, setting itself up for large potential capital shortfalls in case of rising interest rates, deposit outflows and forced asset sales.
- newaccount2023 4y agoWe have an existence proof to the contrary
- peter422 4y agoWhat bank do you use? When was the last time you went over their deposit base and asset allocation?
- belter 4y ago> When was the last time you went over their deposit base and asset allocation? A few times but only for a short time and a small percentage of the capital. Was already a full grown adult in 2008, have good memory, and are still licking many old lion financial battle scars...
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> When was the last time you went over their deposit base and asset allocation Sweep account and credit rating. First is a one-time option. Second, an occasional check.
- hedora 4y agoSweep accounts are fine, but I’m not sure I’d bother with credit ratings. SVB’s was basically as high as possible even for a few hours after the run started and before they closed: https://ir.svb.com/shareholder-and-bondholder-information/credit-ratings/default.aspx https://ir.svb.com/shareholder-and-bondholder-information/cr...
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> SVB’s was basically as high as possible Borderline investment grade isn’t “high as possible.”
- hedora 4y agoI misread the table. Thanks.
- massysett 4y agoI use an FDIC-insured bank. My deposits are under the limit for insurance. I don’t care about its deposit base or asset allocation because that’s the point of deposit insurance: to make retail depositors feel secure. On the other hand, a CFO with millions in cash is a professional whose job is to manage corporate risk. A competent CFO needs to account for things like bank failures, which do happen.
- JJMcJ 4y agoIt wasn't risky as long as prime rate stayed super low. But that rate has been creeping up for months now. SVB was too small to qualify for risk assessment under the revised banking rules. So they could get away with money in volatile securities that were very interest rate sensitive. That said, SVB seemed very solid until Thursday morning.
- Cthulhu_ 4y agoWould it have been better if the rate increases were further apart and there were strong declarations of intent?
- chiefalchemist 4y agoTo clarify, SVB's problems are the result of The Fed's change in direction. It just takes a while to see the affects of those decisions.
- salawat 4y agoSVB's problems were the result of glutting on long maturation bonds instead of bills.
- chiefalchemist 4y agoAs it was explained to me, the Fed increasing interest rates impacted the value of the bonds held by SVB. As that value contracted SVBs was eventually in trouble.
- tome 4y ago> It wasn't risky as long as prime rate stayed super low. That sounds a bit like "it's not risky to driver a motor vehicle as long as you don't get into an accident".
- JJMcJ 4y agoThat's true. The real risk was in imagining that the interest rates would stay super-low forever.
- dmix 4y agoYou think consumer banking is lightly regulated? Or that VC should have their risk controls? Only conservative old school bankers should invest in startups? Or what exactly?
- belter 4y agoNo. Due to the previous crisis, is one part very well regulated. Here is what should happen...The emphasis below on unlikely is mine... "A: In the unlikely event of a bank failure, the FDIC responds in two capacities." "First, as the insurer of the bank's deposits, the FDIC pays insurance to depositors up to the insurance limit. Historically, the FDIC pays insurance within a few days after a bank closing, usually the next business day, by either 1) providing each depositor with a new account at another insured bank in an amount equal to the insured balance of their account at the failed bank, or 2) issuing a check to each depositor for the insured balance of their account at the failed bank.... ...In some cases—for example, deposits that exceed $250,000 and are linked to trust documents or deposits established by a third-party broker—the FDIC may need additional time to determine the amount of deposit insurance coverage and may request supplemental information from the depositor in order to complete the insurance determination..." "Second, as the receiver of the failed bank, the FDIC assumes the task of selling/collecting the assets of the failed bank and settling its debts, including claims for deposits in excess of the insured limit. If a depositor has uninsured funds (i.e., funds above the insured limit), they may recover some portion of their uninsured funds from the proceeds from the sale of failed bank assets. However, it can take several years to sell off the assets of a failed bank. As assets are sold, depositors who had uninsured funds usually receive periodic payments (on a pro-rata "cents on the dollar" basis) on their remaining claim." "Deposit Insurance FAQs" - https://www.fdic.gov/resources/deposit-insurance/faq/ https://www.fdic.gov/resources/deposit-insurance/faq/