4 ms·
> I really would like to use it, but without ability to backup it I totally know the feeling. I was there, I don't believe for a second that enrolling another
by TacticalCoder 4y ago
> I really would like to use it, but without ability to backup it
I totally know the feeling. I was there, I don't believe for a second that enrolling another key is an acceptable option and I solved that problem in a way that works for me.
You can clone your own security key if you're willing to deal with the problem that now becomes: "How do I safely store the secret allowing to restore another security key?".
I'm using paper seeds, split over several countries. A $5 wrench attack on my mom to have her open her safe won't be sufficient. The attacker would need to $5 wrench another half too, which my mom doesn't have.
Ledger Nano S (supposedly a cryptocurrency hardware wallet but I only care about the U2F support) has a U2F "nano app" installable on the key which shall do U2F (and webauthn, which is backward compatible from the device's point of view... It's not clear to me if it's going to work as a "passkey" too or not). They cost $79 or something.
They're using these kind of secure chips from STMicroelectronics: https://www.st.com/en/secure-mcus/st31h320.html https://www.st.com/en/secure-mcus/st31h320.html
Ledger kinda knows what they're doing: their CTO was part of the original FIDO spec group.
Buy two of them, initialize them with the same seed. Make sure to secure your paper seed.
In my case the issue of "cloning and backuping a U2F/webauthn key" is solved. But it's a trade off: now I have to deal with storing the paper seed allowing to restore the U2F key.
In exchange for that hassle I get U2F everywhere (SSH being a big, big, big one) and my security keys are protected by a PIN (three wrong PINs and they reset to factory default). And I don't leave with the constant fear of losing my security key and being locked out of all my services / having to reset everything.
As an added bonus that Ledger Nano S has a tiny device telling you if you're registering or authenticating and it's telling you where you're registering/authenticating. It becomes very hard to trick you into registering/authenticating to a bad party.
Also for me to be really in trouble I'd need to both lose the ability to restore/clone another key and I'd need to lose access to the two security keys that are configured with the same seed.
That is highly unlikely.
- sowbug 4y agoHave you tested this solution? Unless something has changed since the initial spec, each handshake includes a usage counter, which the relying party sees and is supposed to remember. If the usage counter ever fails to increase, then that means something weird happened (like two keys acting as one), and the site can reject you. There are crude ways to deal with this issue, which are fine if you intend for the second to be used only in case of emergency.